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FIDUCIARY EXEMPTION FOR PUBLIC NECESSITY:
SHAREHOLDER PROFIT, PUBLIC GOOD, AND THE
HOBSON'S CHOICE DURING A NATIONAL CRISIS
Robert J. Rhee*
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2008 has posed innumerable problems in law,
policy, and economics. A key event in the history of the financial crisis was
Bank of America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch. Along with the fire sale of
Bear Steams and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the rescue of Merrill
Lynch confirmed the worst fears about the financial crisis. Before this ac-
quisition, Bank of America had long desired a top tier investment banking
business, and Merrill Lynch represented a strategic opportunity to acquire a
troubled but premier franchise of significant scale.' As the financial markets
continued to unravel after execution of the merger agreement, this golden
opportunity turned into a highly risky gamble. Merrill Lynch was losing
money at an astonishing rate, an event sufficient for Bank of America to
consider seriously invoking the merger agreement's material adverse
change clause.2 The deal ultimately closed, but only after the government
threatened to fire Bank of America's management and board if the com-
pany attempted to terminate the deal. The government took this coercive
action to save the financial system from complete collapse. The harm to the
financial system from a broken deal, officials feared, would have been un-
thinkable. The board's motivation is less clear. Like many classic corporate
law cases, the factors influencing the board and management were complex.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; J.D., The George Wash-
ington University; M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton); B.A., University of Chicago. I thank
my colleagues Michelle Hamer, Bill Reynolds, and Gordon Young for their helpful comments and
insights.
1 Bank of America formed from the acquisition of BankAmerica Corp. by NationsBank Corp. in
1998. Caroline Demirs & Dristin Green, Developments in Banking Law: 1998; XIV. Mergers & Acquisi-
tions, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 121, 121-22 (1999). NationsBank was an aggressive, acquisitive bank
under the leadership of Hugh McColl, whom Ken Lewis would ultimately succeed as chief executive
officer ("CEO"). Before the acquisition of BankAmerica, NationsBank had sought an investment bank-
ing franchise, and following this strategy acquired in 1997 Montgomery Securities, a midsized San
Francisco-based investment bank. Peter Truell, Nationsbank Confirms a $1.2 Billion Deal for Mont-
gomery, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at D5. The acquisition of Merrill Lynch is a continuation of Bank of
America's ambition in investment banking.
2 See infra Part I (describing the events surrounding the acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the
testimonies of key principals).
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This history serves as a contextualizing framework to analyze a theo-
retical issue in corporate governance. Corporate governance is generally
considered a private activity. The business of the corporation is managed or
supervised by the board of directors;3 shareholders and the government
typically react to the decisions of the management and the board.4 But this
unique episode in American business history raises important, novel ques-
tions that lie at the intersection of corporate governance and public crisis
management: (1) During a public crisis, should the board have specific
authority and discretion to advance the public welfare at the direct cost of
the shareholder wealth? (2) If so, what is the nature and scope of its fiduci-
ary duty?5 While the facts surrounding Bank of America's acquisition of
Merrill Lynch are unusual, they are not sui generis. The analysis of these
questions is important since, however infrequent, there will always be na-
tional emergencies that entangle the government and corporations in a
complex relationship. Framed more broadly, these questions continue, in
the context of a global financial crisis, the debate on the purpose of the cor-
poration and the manager's duty to serve that end.6
This Article is written as two discrete, independently accessible topical
sections. The first topical section, presented in Part I of this Article, is a
case study of Bank of America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the im-
pact of a flawed merger execution on the board's subsequent decisions. I
provide this case study for two reasons. First, the human and economic
story is inherently interesting. I construct a narrative from various factual
sources, mostly congressional testimonies and U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") filings, and it tells a compelling tale of the
3 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008); MODEL BUs. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2003).
4 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2008) (requiring shareholder approval for merger or
consolidation); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.03(b) (2003) (requiring shareholder approval of amend-
ment of articles of incorporation).
5 Other episodes of the financial crisis of 2008 have already taught us lessons in corporate gov-
emance. Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock recently provided a case study on JPMorgan Chase's acquisi-
tion of Bear Steams, wherein the authors concluded that the means used for the acquisition probably
violated Delaware law. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad
Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 716-21 (2009)
[hereinafter Kahan & Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law]. Additionally, Dela-
ware courts have already begun to decide cases related to the conduct of boards and management of
financial institutions during the financial crisis. See In re Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch.
2009); In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
6 The debate on corporate purpose is long running. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers
as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (corporate agents exercise power "only for the
ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears"); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (a corporation "has a social
service as well as a profit-making function"). Yet even now it is "the most basic and arguably most
persistent controversy in corporation law." William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067,
1071 (2002) [hereinafter Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate].
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historic financial crisis. This history has inherent worth and scholarly syn-
thesis should preserve a factual account of these important events. Second,
a case study provides the empirical milieu of the complexity and immedi-
acy of the corporate decision-making process and the enormity of the stakes
involved during a national crisis.7 Based on this factual record, I conclude
that Bank of America failed to conduct proper due diligence and overpaid
for Merrill Lynch, calling into serious question whether its board violated
the duty of care. Unfortunately or fortunately, depending on the perspec-
tive, the board did not have a sound contractual basis to invoke the material
adverse change clause in the merger agreement to terminate the merger.
Irrespective of a government threat, the board cannot be held liable for fail-
ing to exercise a dubious legal option, the exercise of which would have
imperiled the company through legal liability and the financial market
through the injection of systemic risk.'
The second topical section, presented in Parts II through IV of this Ar-
ticle, advances a theoretical basis for fiduciary exemption during a public
crisis. I make explicit a fundamental assumption running throughout this
Article: that is, the circumstances examined here are where a corporation is
uniquely situated to avert or mitigate a public crisis at a substantial private
cost to the firm, but where the cost-benefit calculation from a societal per-
spective overwhelmingly weighs in favor of such action. This is the essen-
tial nature of a public necessity.9 We saw the possibility, but not the realiza-
tion, of this situation when Bank of America appeared to be uniquely situ-
ated to prevent a further meltdown of the capital markets by assuming
Merrill Lynch's breathtaking losses accruing in between signing the merger
agreement and closing. Consider, then, the counterfactual: suppose Bank of
America's board did have a viable legal option to terminate the acquisition,
thereby the option to forego massive financial loss at the direct cost of ex-
acerbating a global financial crisis. Can the board harm shareholders' eco-
nomic interest when the corporation is uniquely situated to promote the
public good during a national crisis? One day in a different set of facts aris-
7 There are several shareholder derivative and federal securities actions involving the Bank of
America-Merrill Lynch deal. See, e.g., In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative & Employment Ret.
Income Sec. Act (ERISA) Litig., 258 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Verified Consolidated Amended
Derivative Complaint, In re Bank of Am. Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., No. 4307-VCS (Del. Ch.
May 8, 2009) [hereinafter Derivative Complaint], available at http://www.whafb.com/modules/case/
docs/5496 cid 3 bofa%20complaint.pdf. See also Motion to Dismiss, In re Bank of Am. Corp. Stock-
holder Derivative Litig., No. 4307-VCS (Del. Ch., June 19, 2009). The analysis in this Article does not
predict how these cases should be resolved. Important facts, such as the adequacy of disclosure, can
only be established through fact-finding or admission. Rather, this episode is used as a contextualizing
vehicle to discuss broader policy questions in corporate law.
8 See infra Part II.A (discussing why Bank of America could not legally terminate the merger
with Merrill Lynch under the merger agreement's material adverse effect clause).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965) (stating that the public necessity doctrine
allows one to enter the property of another to avert an "imminent public disaster").
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ing from a public crisis, a board may confront this Hobson's choice be-
tween maximizing shareholder profit and protecting the public good.
The Bank of America-Merrill Lynch episode serves as a contextualiz-
ing vehicle to advance a theory of fiduciary exemption arising out of public
necessity. A board's action to nationalize corporate governance and purpose
per public necessity is authorized by Delaware law, specifically section
122(12) of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), which thus
far has received scant attention. This Article constructs around this statute a
framework for recognizing a fiduciary exemption based on the board's de-
termination that the firm, being uniquely situated to avert or mitigate the
public crisis, should provide aid. Simply stated, public necessity, a well-
established concept borrowed from tort law, excuses the destruction of pri-
vate property (in the context here, not the destruction but the transfer of
assets to other parties or causes)." When the board perceives that the threat
to the public welfare is great enough, the shareholder primacy norm can and
sometimes does fail the stress test of a crisis.
Part I presents the case study of the merger and analyzes the fiduciary
duty issues. Readers who are not interested in the factual details and legal
issues of the Bank of America-Merrill Lynch merger episode can skip this
Part without loss of essential context. Part II advances the idea of fiduciary
exemption, which is justified under a theory of public necessity. Part III
frames this theory in the broader context of the continuing debate on share-
holder primacy and corporate purpose. The Merrill Lynch acquisition dem-
onstrates the conditional limits of the shareholder primacy norm. Share-
holder primacy is best understood as a default norm serving as a proxy for
the normatively superior principle of social wealth and welfare maximiza-
tion. Part IV discusses the state-federal political aspect of corporate govern-
ance and public crisis management. If state corporate law undermines na-
tional crisis management policies, this Article argues, the federal govern-
ment could enact a fiduciary safe harbor; or perhaps more aggressively it
could enact a limited duty to assist government authority for the boards of
systemically or strategically-important corporations, such as those belong-
ing to the financial, energy, pharmaceutical, and technology sectors, just to
name a few.
I. CASE STUDY OF THE MERRILL LYNCH ACQUISITION
In 2008, three major investment banks-Bear Steams, Lehman Broth-
ers, and Merrill Lynch-collapsed or were acquired under distress, and
10 See id. cmt. f (stating that the public necessity privilege includes the privilege to tear down or
destroy buildings, remove explosives or other dangerous articles, dig ditches, remove levees, or under-
take any other acts reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the privilege).
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these events played a large part in triggering the global financial crisis." In
March, Bear Steams had already agreed to be sold in a fire sale to JPMor-
gan Chase.' 2 This sale was a harbinger of the worst to come. By late sum-
mer, many of the largest, most important domestic and foreign financial
institutions faced extraordinary peril, including Citigroup and American
International Group ("AIG"), two of the largest American financial institu-
tions at the time.'3 On September 15, Lehman Brothers announced its bank-
ruptcy, and Bank of America ("the Bank") and Merrill Lynch ("Merrill")
announced their merger. 4 If the fall of Bear Steams was the first major
tremor in the financial markets, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers trig-
gered a seismic change from market disturbance to market failure. The
pending merger between the Bank and Merrill subsequently got caught in
this tectonic shift. Like everything else affected by the market meltdown,
the merger's fate faced great uncertainty and the events leading to the ulti-
mate closing of this landmark deal constitute a major episode of the history
of Wall Street and the financial crisis of 2008.
A. Acquisition in Crisis
The merger proxy recounts the extraordinary circumstances under
which this acquisition was struck." On Saturday, September 13, Ken Lewis
and John Thain, the CEOs of the Bank and Merrill, respectively, met to
discuss a strategic relationship. 6 Thain proposed a 9.9 percent minority
11 See generally Robert J. Rhee, The Decline of lnvestment Banking: Preliminary Thoughts on the
Evolution of the Industry 1996-2008, 5 J. Bus. L. & TECH. 75 (2010) (discussing the collapse of the
investment banking sector). At the time, there were only five full-service, independent investment banks
left after the industry consolidation of the 1990s and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Id. at 76. The
banks were Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Steams. Id. at
75-76.
12 The purchase price was about $10 per share. See Kahan & Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases
from Making Bad Law, supra note 5, at 716-21 (describing the circumstances surrounding the deal). A
year before, Bear Steams shares traded at $170 per share. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas, Jr.,
JPMorgan Acts to Buy Ailing Bear Stearns at Huge Discount, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008.
13 See Joe Nocera, 36 Hours ofAlarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at
Al (describing the crisis and the troubles of financial institutions).
14 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wall St., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al.
15 BANK OF AM. CORP. & MERRILL LYNCH & CO., MERGER PROXY 49-51 (2008) [hereinafter
MERGER PROXY].
16 Id. at 49. Lewis has been the Bank's chief executive officer since 2001. During the period
analyzed here, mainly from September 2008 to January 2009, he was also the chairman of the board. On
April 29, 2009, he was replaced by Walter Massey as chairman, though he remained a board member.
Press Release, Bank of Am. Corp., Bank of America Announces Results of Annual Meeting (Apr. 29,
2009), available at http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/index.php?s=43&item8443. John Thain was
appointed chief executive officer of Merrill in December 2007. He resigned from Merrill shortly after
the merger closed in January 2009. Julie Creswell & Louise Story, Merrill Lynch's Leader Gets the Ax;
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investment in Merrill, but Lewis wanted a whole acquisition.' 7 Lewis
quickly got his way, and they agreed on an acquisition. Due diligence
commenced that day and continued well into Sunday night. 8 During these
frantic two days, the two parties negotiated the terms of the merger.' 9 The
deal was structured as a stock exchange with Merrill shareholders getting
0.8595 shares of the Bank's stock for each share of Merrill stock.2" This
constituted a hefty 70 percent premium over the previous Friday's closing
share prices of the two companies," and valued Merrill at a multiple of 1.8x
tangible book value.22 In late Sunday afternoon, the financial advisers in-
formed the Bank's board about the results of the due diligence and provided
their fairness opinions.23 The boards of the two banks unanimously ap-
proved the merger.24 The merger agreement was signed on early Monday
25
morning.
The loss of Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers and Merrill-three of only
five full-service, independent investment banks remaining on Wall Street at
the time-in rapid succession was inconceivable only a few months be-
fore.26 By the time the Merrill acquisition was announced on Monday, Sep-
tember 15, the stock market crash was well underway. The Standard &
Poor's ("S&P") 500 index was down 24 percent from its October 2007 his-
toric highs.27 A few weeks later, in October 2008, the equity market fell off
the cliff and the S&P 500 index was down 43 percent fiom the year be-
Ouster Follows Losses that Forced Bank of America to Seek More Aid, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan 23,
2009, at 1. Subsequently, Lewis also announced his early resignation. See WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE
OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET 109 (2009).
17 MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, at 49.
18 Id. at 49-50.
19 Id. at50.
20 Id. at 5.
21 Id. at 53. On September 12, 2008, the Bank's stock price closed at $33.74 and Merrill's stock
closed at $17.05, implying a deal value of $29 per share of Merrill stock. Id. Subsequently, on October
30, the Bank stock closed at $22.78 and Merrill's stock, which by this time was closely pegged to the
Bank's stock price, was $17.78. Id. at 8.
22 Press Release, Merrill Lynch & Co., Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch, Creating Unique
Financial Services Firm (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ml.com/?id=769576968149_
88278 106886 108117.
23 MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, at 51.
24 Id.
25 id.
26 See generally Rhee, supra note 11, at 75-76 (discussing the demise of Bear Steams, Lehman
Brothers, and Merrill Lynch, and generally the problems independent investment banks confronted
during the financial crisis).
27 On October 9, 2007, the S&P 500 closed at 1565.15. On September 15, 2008, it closed at
1192.7. Index price information is available at Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited
Mar. 12, 2010).
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fore.28 The stock market crash reflected broader economic problems such as
the crash of the housing market, severe disturbances in the credit markets,
illiquidity contagion among financial institutions, global recession, and
increasing unemployment.29 The most troubling and dangerous of these
factors was a liquidity crisis in the credit markets, including commercial
paper, repo, and money markets that fund operating cash flow for many
businesses.3 ° Investment banks were not immune, and indeed they were
especially vulnerable to a disturbance in the credit market because of their
highly leveraged balance sheets.3' An inability to fund working capital had
the potential to wreck havoc by impairing the flow of credit even in healthy,
nonfinancial sectors of the economy.31 According to Ben Bernanke, a
prominent scholar of the Great Depression and current Chairman of the
Federal Reserve, "the financial shocks that hit the global economy in Sep-
tember and October were the worst since the 1930s, and they helped push
the global economy into the deepest recession since World War I1.''33 This
crisis prompted the federal government to take unprecedented intervention
in the market.
On October 3, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 into law. 4 This centerpiece legislation
of the financial crisis authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program
("TARP"), a $700 billion fund available to the U.S. Treasury Department
28 On October 10, 2008, the S&P 500 closed at 899.22. On March 9, 2009, the index closed at
676.53, down 57 percent from the historic high on October 9, 2007. Index price information is available
Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
29 See generally MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: GLOBAL PANIC AND GOVERNMENT
BAILOUTS-How WE GOT HERE AND WHAT MUST BE DONE TO FIX IT (2009).
30 Conrad de Aenlle, It Couldn't Get Worse, But It Did, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008 at BUI9
(noting that credit markets were seizing up and investors were withdrawing money from the commercial
paper market). See also Carter Dougherty & Katrin Bennhold, Credit Squeeze Takes Hold in Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008.
3 1 Rhee, supra note 11, at 82.
32 id.
33 Humphrey Hawkins Hearing on Monetary Policy: Hearing Before the H. Financial Servs.
Comm., 11 1 th Congr. (July 21, 2009) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Board of
Governors). Bemanke was a professor of economics at Princeton University before his appointment as
chairman of the Federal Reserve. He testified that without the massive government intervention the
economy would probably have collapsed. He provided this chilling assessment:
I think you would've had a very good chance of a collapse of the credit system. Even what
we did see, with perhaps the failure of Lehman was for example, commercial paper rates shot
up and availability declined. Many other markets were severely disrupted, including corpo-
rate bond markets. So even with the rescue and even with the stabilization that we achieved
in October, there was a severe increase in stress in the financial markets. My belief is that if
we had not had the money to address the global banking crisis in October we might very well
have had a collapse of the global banking system that would've created a huge problem in fi-
nancial markets, and in the broad economy that might've lasted many years.
Id.
34 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 26, and 31 U.S.C.).
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("the Treasury") to buy troubled assets from financial institutions. Shortly
thereafter, the Treasury used TARP to inject $125 billion in capital in the
form of preferred shares and warrants into nine leading financial institu-
tions, including the Bank and Merrill.36 With respect to the Bank, the fed-
eral government purchased 600,000 shares of nonvoting preferred stock and
warrants to purchase over seventy-three million shares of common stock.37
However, the government did not acquire substantial voting control over
the Bank.38
On November 3, 2008, the Bank issued the merger proxy with infor-
mation dated as of October 30.39 The proxy identified as a risk factor the
possibility that changing market conditions may ultimately affect the deal
economics." Among other things, it warned that changes in the operations
and prospects, general market and economic conditions "may significantly
alter the value of Bank of America or Merrill Lynch or the prices of shares
of Bank of America common stock or Merrill Lynch common stock by the
time the merger is completed.""
On November 5, 2008, Merrill reported in its third quarter 10-Q an
$8.25 billion pretax loss from continuing operations.42 The 10-Q disclosed
difficult market conditions that could adversely affect financial results.43 A
day later, the Bank also issued its 10-Q, which provided similar warnings,
31 12 U.S.C. § 5225 (2009).
36 On October 28, 2008, these capital injections were made: Bank of America ($15 billion), Bank
of New York Mellon ($3 billion), Citigroup ($25 billion), Goldman Sachs ($10 billion), JPMorgan
Chase ($25 billion), Morgan Stanley ($10 billion), State Street ($2 billion), Wells Fargo ($25 billion),
Merrill Lynch ($10 billion). OFFICE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM TRANSACTIONS REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING NOVEMBER 13, 2009 (2009),
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/1 1-17-09%2OTransactions%2OReport/o
20as%20of%/2011-13-09.pdf. Preferred stock is equity capital that has priority over common stock, and
is usually characterized by a priority on dividends and assets upon liquidation relative to common stock.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1553 (9th ed. 2009). Warrants are stock options issued by the company. Id.
at 1724.
37 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Item 1.01 (Oct. 31, 2008).
38 The 73 million shares would constitute a small percentage of shares. See Bank of Am. Corp.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 27, 2009) (over five billion shares of common stock issued and
outstanding as of December 31, 2008).
39 MERGER PROXY, supra note 15.
40 Id. at 23-26.
41 Id. at 24.
42 Merrill Lynch & Co., Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q), at 4 (Nov. 5, 2008).
43 Merrill cautioned that "[tihe challenging conditions that existed in the global financial markets
during the first half of the year continued during the third quarter of 2008"; that this "adverse market
environment [had] intensified towards the end of the quarter, particularly in September, and was charac-
terized by increased illiquidity in the credit markets, wider credit spreads ... and concerns about corpo-
rate earnings and the solvency of many financial institutions"; that "[tiurbulent market conditions in the
short and medium-term will continue to have an adverse impact on our core businesses"; and that "our
businesses must contend with extreme volatility and continued de-leveraging in the market." Id. at 82-
83.
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including "Merrill Lynch's ability to mitigate its risk by selling or hedging
its exposures is also limited by the market environment, and its future re-
sults may continue to be materially impacted by the valuation adjustments
applied to these positions."" These disclosures simply stated the obvious.
The common experience of all investors in the equity markets, including
shareholders of both Merrill and the Bank, would have suggested that the
financial markets were highly volatile.
In late November 2008, the Federal Reserve approved the merger un-
der the Bank Holding Act,45 and on December 5, the shareholders of the
Bank and Merrill voted in favor of the deal.46 Thereafter, in early December
while the acquisition was still pending, Lewis learned that Merrill was ac-
cruing enormous losses from its investments in toxic assets.47 On December
14, he advised the board of this development.48 This unexpected news gave
the Bank serious pause about closing the acquisition. Lewis considered
exercising the merger agreement's material adverse change clause
("MAC"), which if legally exercised would have allowed the company to
terminate the deal based on a material change in events after the signing of
the merger agreement but before closing.49
On December 17, Lewis told Henry Paulson, then Treasury Secretary,
and Bernanke that the Bank was considering invoking the MAC. 0 Lewis
told them that the estimated losses at Merrill were $12 billion for the fourth
quarter of 2008, a staggering $3 billion increase from the previous estimate
of just six days before.5  These losses were stunning. 2 Paulson and Ber-
44 Bank of Am. Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 175-77 (Nov. 6, 2008). The 10-Q also
disclosed: that "[d]ifficult market conditions have adversely affected our industry"; that there has been
"significant write-downs of asset values by financial institutions"; and that "lack of confidence in the
financial markets has adversely affected our business, financial condition and results of operations." Id.
at 175.
45 Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?
Part II.- Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 11 th Congr. (June 25,
2009) (statement of Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Board of Governors for the Fed. Reserve System)
[hereinafter Bernanke Congressional Testimony].
46 id.
47 In Re: Executive Compensation Investigation, Bank of America-Merrill Lynch: Examination
Before the Attorney General of the State of New York 11-12 (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media center/2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit/ 20A%2Oto%204.23.09%2etter.pdf
(examination of Kenneth Lee Lewis, Chief Executive Officer, Bank of America) [hereinafter Lewis
Testimony Before the New York Attorney General] (identifying the period as December 5 through 14).
48 Id. at 13.
49 Id. at 37.
50 Bemanke was appointed to a four-year term as the chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve on February 1, 2006. Paulson was the Treasury Secretary from July 2006 to January
2009 under the Bush administration. Before this, he was the CEO of Goldman Sachs.
51 Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 40.
52 In an e-mail, Paulson described the losses as "breath-taking." Michael R. Crittenden, Fed
Emails Bash BofA Chief in Tussle over Merrill Deal, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at Al. Another inter-
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nanke strongly advised Lewis against terminating the Merrill deal because
they believed that this would lead to adverse consequences, including the
insolvency of Merrill, litigation against the Bank, and the injection of more
systemic risk and uncertainty into the capital market. 3 The Federal Reserve
believed that if the deal fell through, Merrill could not have survived as an
independent firm and would have collapsed like Bear Steams and Lehman
Brothers.54 It feared that Merrill's collapse would have continued a domino
effect to other systemically-important financial institutions.5
On December 21, Lewis talked to Paulson again about exercising the
MAC. During this crucial conversation, Paulson threatened to fire the
Bank's board and management if the company sought to terminate or rene-
gotiate the merger.56 Such termination or renegotiation of the deal would
have jeopardized the merger or delayed its closing.57 Lewis took this mes-
sage back to the board.58
On December 22, the board met to discuss whether it was still in favor
of proceeding with the Merrill acquisition.59 The board minutes show that
Lewis in his CEO capacity reported to the board these key points of the call
with Paulson:
(i) first and foremost, the Treasury and Fed are unified in their view that the failure of the
Corporation to complete the acquisition of Merrill Lynch would result in systemic risk to the
financial services system in America and would have adverse consequences for the Corpora-
tion;
(ii) second, the Treasury and Fed stated strongly that were the Corporation to invoke the ma-
terial adverse change ("MAC") clause in the merger agreement with Merrill Lynch and fail
to close the transaction, the Treasury and Fed would remove the Board and management of
the Corporation;
(iii) third, the Treasury and Fed have confirmed that they will provide assistance to the Cor-
poration to restore capital and to protect the Corporation against adverse impact of certain
Merrill Lynch assets; and
nal e-mail from a senior vice president at the Federal Reserve reads, "Merrill is really scary and ugly."
Paul Tharp, Lewis Ticks 'Em Off; Jittery BofA Head Keeps Silence Before Congress, N.Y. POST, June
12, 2009, at 31.
53 See infra Part I.B. (discussing the roles of both Paulson and Bemanke).
54 Merrill's deterioration was significant, and "all but ensure[d] that the firm could not survive as
a stand-alone entity without raising substantial new capital [and/or government support] that is unlikely
to be available given the uncertainty about its prospects." Phil Mattingly, Did Bank of America Get
Stong-Armed in Merrill Deal?, C.Q. TODAY, June 10, 2009, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfn?
doclD=news-000003140207.
55 Id.
56 Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 52.
57 Id.
58 id.
59 Id. at 53.
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(iv) fourth, the Fed and Treasury stated that the investment and asset protection promised
could not be provided or completed by the scheduled closing date of the merger, January 1,
2009; that the merger should close as scheduled; and that the Corporation can rely on the Fed
and Treasury to complete and deliver the promised support by January 20, 2009, the date
scheduled for the release of earnings by the Corporation. 60
At the board meeting, Lewis communicated the management's recommen-
dation not to invoke the MAC. 6' This recommendation was based on,
among other things, "instruction from the Fed and Treasury not to exercise
the MAC" and the government's verbal assurance of financial assistance
through TARP to support the Bank and provide some downside protection
against declining asset values.62 One board member, called to testify before
Congress, recalled the following from the board meeting:
[Lewis] expressed the fact that the government thought it would be a major mistake for us to
walk away. They thought it would be a systemic-very dangerous systemically and very
dangerous and not-not positive at all for the Bank of America.
[H]e expressed the sentiment, you know, in another session later in the month that the gov-
ernment would provide financ[ing] although there was nothing in writing. But it was from
very-very senior officials of the govemment that one would believe would follow through.
The details were not [reviewed] with the board .... The issue was relatively clear. I mean in
a-in a perfect world it would have been better to walk away.63
With respect to the board's inability or disinclination to "walk away" from
Merrill, this board member "express[ed] remorse for all shareholders" who
took the financial loss. 4
Based on the considerations presented to the board, it decided not to
invoke the MAC, renegotiate the merger price with Merrill, or inform
shareholders of Merrill's losses ahead of planned disclosure. 65 The minutes
purport to document the basis for this decision:
60 Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America Corporation, at 2 (Dec.
22, 2008) [hereinafter Board Minutes of Dec. 22, 2008], available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_
center/2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit%/o2OB%20to%204.23.09%201etter.pdf (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 2-3.
62 id.
63 Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?
Part IV: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111 th Cong. (Nov. 17,
2009) [hereinafter Oversight Committee Hearing, Part IV] (testimony of Charles Gifford, Member,
Bank of America Board of Directors) (emphasis added).
64 Id. This testimony sought to explain an email in which the board member wrote: "Unfortu-
nately, it[] also screw[s] the shareholders." Id. While the language in this private email is crude, it pro-
vides an unvarnished assessment of the effect on shareholders.
65 Board Minutes of Dec. 22, 2008, supra note 60, at 2-3. The minutes provide:
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Discussion ensued, with the Board clarifying that [it] was not persuaded or influenced by the
statement by the federal regulators that the Board and management would be removed by the
federal regulators if the Corporation were to exercise the MAC clause and fail to complete
the acquisition of Merrill Lynch. The Board concurred it would reach a decision that it
deemed in the best interest of the Corporation and its shareholders without regard to this rep-
resentation by the federal regulators. 66
While self-consciously professing its independence, the board made a con-
sidered decision (the deliberate decision not to invoke the MAC), and
thereby decided to close the Merrill merger as planned.67
On January 1, 2009, ten days after the Bank's board meeting, the ac-
quisition of Merrill closed.68 Other than the original merger proxy, there
was no supplemental disclosure to shareholders on Merrill's deteriorating
financial condition before closing.69
On January 16, the Bank disclosed that losses from Merrill were over
$15 billion for the fourth quarter ending December 31, 2008.70 This was
over $3 billion more than the $12 billion estimate Lewis had learned in
mid-December, but the information had not been disclosed to sharehold-
ers.7 The Bank also disclosed that it would receive an additional $20 billion
in TARP funds (an investment of preferred stock with an 8 percent divi-
dend), and would receive insurance protection from market exposure of
$118 billion in assets, primarily exposure from Merrill's portfolio.7 2
B. Reflections of the Principal Actors
Like the fire sale of Bear Steams and the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, the acquisition of Merrill was a key event in the history of Wall
Street and the financial crisis.73 This deal also became controversial.74
Mr. Lewis stated the purpose of the special meeting is to insure that the Board is in accord
with management's recommendation to complete the acquisition of Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc. ('Merrill Lynch'), as scheduled on January 1, 2009, pursuant to the terms of [the merger
agreement] ... after due consideration of the undertakings and admonishments of the federal
regulators.
Id. at 1.
66 Id. at 3.
67 id.
68 Press Release, Merrill Lynch & Co., Bank of America Completes Merrill Lynch Purchase (Jan.
1, 2009), available at http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695_7696_8149113521113522113523.
Based on the stock price, the deal closed at a value of $29.1 billion. Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q), at 9 (May 7, 2009).
69 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
70 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Jan. 16, 2009).
71 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
72 Bank of Am. Corp, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Jan. 16, 2009).
73 The demise of these three firms marks the end of Wall Street's era of independent investment
banks. During the 1990s, leading up to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, independent investment
banks had been acquired by large commercial banks. See generally ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J.
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Without the involvement of Paulson and Bemanke, there was a possibility
that the Bank would have invoked the MAC and thereby compromised or
complicated the deal. Controversy surrounding the government's role in the
merger ensued when Lewis was called to testify before the New York At-
torney General's office.75
Lewis testified that the federal government played a coercive role in
the merger.76 The government disapproved of terminating the deal or delay-
ing the closing to renegotiate price.77 Paulson threatened that if the Bank
backed out of the deal with Merrill the government "could" or "would" fire
the management and board.78 Lewis believed that the government had the
power to carry out its threat.79 Upon being threatened, he suggested that the
Bank and government "deescalate this for a while."8 Absent the federal
government's threat, Lewis wanted to invoke the MAC, but felt he had no
choice in the matter.8 He thought that "it was in the best interest to go for-
ward as had been instructed" because "if [the government] felt that
strongly, [then] that should be a strong consideration for us to take into ac-
count."82 As far as shareholders, their interests could not be isolated from
systemic risk considerations; the best interests of the country and share-
holders were intertwined.83 While going forward with the deal meant a
short-term loss for shareholders, Merrill still filled strategic necessities and
over the long term would still benefit shareholders.8 4
After this testimony, the New York Attorney General's office wrote to
Congress and informed it of questions "about the transparency of the TARP
program, as well as about corporate governance and disclosure practices at
WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW (2007) (discussing the
business of investment banking and historical industry trends). Each of these firms was acquired by a
commercial bank: Bear Steams by JPMorgan Chase, investment banking assets of Lehman Brothers by
Barclays, and Merrill Lynch by Bank of America. Today, only Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
remain independent, pure investment banks even though they converted to bank holding companies in
2008. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1-2 (Jan. 27, 2009); Morgan Stanley
& Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Jan. 29, 2009).
74 Louise Story & Jo Becker, Bank Chief Tells of U.S. Pressure to Buy Merrill Lynch, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2009, at BI ; Zachary Kouwe, Paulson Expected to Face Hard Questioning on Merrill
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at B3; Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke Defends His Role in Merrill
Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at B I.
75 The attorney general's office was investigating agreements on executive bonuses associated
with the merger. See infra note 113.
76 See Lewis Testimony before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 52.
77 id.
78 Id. at 52.
79 Id. at 54.
80 Id. at 52.
81 Id. at 58, 96.
82 Lewis Testimony before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 97, 15 1.
83 Id. at 82-83.
84 Id. at 86.
2010]
GEO. MASON L. REv. [VOL. 17:3
Bank of America."85 This prompted the congressional testimonies of
Lewis,86 Bemanke, 7 and Paulson."5 While their testimonies differ in shades,
they largely support Lewis's account of events.
Lewis reaffirmed his prior testimony that Paulson's threat did not im-
press him so much as the seriousness of a situation that could have led the
government to threaten a company and CEO in good standing.89 The exer-
cise of the MAC would have posed risks, including litigation risk and the
risk of losing government support during a financial crisis.9" According to
Lewis, closing the deal was the better option.9 He added that the "target
was to [complete the merger] so that we didn't damage the economy any
more."9 The Merrill acquisition was "in the best interests of the financial
system, the economy and the country" because the collapse of Merrill, "on
the heels of Lehman's failure, could have caused systemic havoc or necessi-
tated an AIG-style government bailout." 3 Shareholder interest was inextri-
cably intertwined with the financial system; harm to the financial system
would have inflicted harm to the company as well.94 Furthermore, the ac-
85 Letter from Andrew Cuomo, Att'y Gen. of the State of N.Y., to Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chair-
man, Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs; Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, H. Fin. Servs.
Comm.; Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, Sec. Exch. Comm'n; and Elizabeth Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight
Panel at 1 (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media-center/2009/apr/pdfs/BofAmergL-
etter.pdf.
86 Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, Morning Session, 111 th Cong.
(June 11, 2009) (testimony of Kenneth Lee Lewis, Chief Executive Officer, Bank of America) [herein-
after Lewis Congressional Testimony Part I]; Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How did a Private
Deal Turn into a Federal Bailout?: Hearing Before H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform,
Afternoon Session, 11 th Cong. (testimony of Kenneth Lee Lewis, Chief Executive Officer, Bank of
America) (June 11,2009) [hereinafter Lewis Congressional Testimony Part 11].
87 Bernanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45.
88 Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout? Part
IlH" Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform and Subcomm. on Domestic
Policy, 111 th Cong. (July 16, 2009) (testimony of Henry Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinaf-
ter Paulson Congressional Testimony]; Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How did a Private Deal
Turn Into a Federal Bailout? Part III: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government
Reform and Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, 111 th Cong. (July 16, 2009) (prepared statement of Paulson)
[hereinafter Paulson Prepared Testimony], available at http://online.wsj.comlpublic/resources/docu-
ments/WSJ-20090715-PaulsonTestimony.pdf.
89 Lewis Congressional Testimony Part I, supra note 86.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.; see also Paulson Congressional Testimony, supra note 88 (confirming Lewis's recollec-
tion).
93 Lewis Congressional Testimony Part I, supra note 86. Lewis was criticized in the media for
putting the interest of the country over that of shareholders. See Sinclair Stewart, The Merrill Takeover:
Patriotic Bumbling? Bank of America 's CEO Cites Loyalty to Country; After Huge Losses, Investors
Wonder if His Motive was Misguided, GLOBE& MAIL, Jan. 17, 2009, at B4.
94 Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 12.
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quisition had strategic value and promised long-term reward.95 Merrill's
losses would push the profitability of the deal toward a longer time horizon
and affected short-term shareholder value.96 As for disclosure, the govern-
ment did not ask the board to withhold any disclosure to shareholders.97
Merrill's losses were not disclosed before the deal closed because there was
no agreement on its timing.98
For his part, Paulson confirmed that he threatened to fire the board and
management.99 He testified that the exercise of the MAC would have dem-
onstrated "a colossal lack of judgment and would jeopardize Bank of Amer-
ica, Merrill Lynch and the financial system."' ° He and Bemanke believed
that invoking a MAC would have been detrimental to both the Bank and the
financial system.'' Lawyers at the Federal Reserve believed that the Bank
did not have sound legal basis to exercise the MAC."°2 The market would
have viewed the legal merit of invoking the MAC as quite low, and both
Merrill and the Bank would have been adversely affected by the possibility
of detrimental litigation.0 3 In justifying his threat, Paulson added that "it's a
pretty logical conclusion that maybe even the regulator would be irrespon-
sible . . . if they didn't hold [the Bank and Merrill] accountable."'' " This
statement implies that the board and management of the Bank would have
been replaced if they had proceeded with an ill-advised legal stratagem to
abort the merger.
Bernanke and Paulson distinguished their obligations as regulators
from the board's duty to shareholders. They testified that SEC disclosure
obligations were the company's responsibility.0 5 The government's disclo-
9' ld. at 7, 3 1.
96 Id. at 23, 31.
97 Lewis Congressional Testimony Part II, supra note 86.
98 Lewis Testimony before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 33-34.
99 Paulson Congressional Testimony, supra note 88; Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 88,
at 3. With respect to Bemanke's role, he testified that, "I did not threaten him" and "I didn't tie it di-
rectly to replacing him or the board." Bemanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45. Nor did he
instruct Paulson to communicate the threat. Id. at 14; Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 88, at 5.
In his memoir, Paulson wrote of the incident:
I got back to Ken later and again emphasized to him that the government would not let any
systemically important institution fail; that exercising the MAC would show a colossal lack
of judgment by BofA; that such an action would jeopardize his bank, Merrill Lynch, and the
entire financial system; and that under such circumstances, the Fed, as BofA's regulator,
could take extreme measures, including the removal of management and the board.
HENRY PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 429-30 (2010).
100 Paulson Congressional Testimony, supra note 88.
101 Bernanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45; Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note
88, at 3.
102 Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 88, at 3.
103 Id. at 3.
104 Paulson Congressional Testimony, supra note 88.
105 Id.
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sure obligation is to the public, set forth in TARP, which the government
satisfied." 6 Bank supervisory practice did not permit a regulator to impose
an obligation on a financial institution to financially injure itself for the
public interest."7 Conversely, regulators did not have a duty to protect the
pecuniary interest of shareholders or bondholders vis-A-vis the soundness of
the financial institution and the markets or more broadly the public welfare.
In administering TARP, the Treasury Secretary must take into consideration
various factors including the protection of taxpayers, stability of the finan-
cial markets, long-term viability of financial institutions, and efficient use
of funds.'08
Bernanke and Paulson echoed Lewis's assessment of the public role
the Bank served in stabilizing the financial market: Merrill would have col-
lapsed without a takeover; a renegotiation of the purchase price would have
created uncertainty in the market; the failure of Merrill, which was bigger
than Lehman Brothers, would have destabilized the financial market even
further. 109
On the issue of whether the Bank's shareholders were forced "to take a
bullet,""0 Paulson testified:
[S]ome have opined that I and other government officials allowed concerns about systemic
risk to outweigh concerns about potential harm to Bank of America and its shareholders.
That simply did not happen. In my view and the view of numerous government officials
working on the matter, the interests of the nation and Bank of America were aligned with re-
spect to closing of the Merrill Lynch transaction.'
Bemanke added: "I think it was a very successful transaction. It helped
stabilize the financial markets. It put the two companies back on a healthy
path. It protected our economy. And it was a good deal for taxpayers....
And it achieved public policy objectives that were very important.""' 2 Thus,
both Paulson and Bemanke forcefully defended their conduct and argued
that govenment action produced positive effects on the two companies and
the financial markets.
106 Bemanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45.
107 id.
108 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 26, and 31 U.S.C.).
109 Bemanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45; Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note
88, at 3.
110 Paulson Congressional Testimony, supra note 88.
111 Id.; see also Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 88, at 4 ("An attempt by Bank of America
to break its contract to acquire Merrill Lynch would have threatened the stability of our entire financial
system and the viability of both Bank of America and Merrill Lynch.").
112 Bernanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45.
[VOL. 17:3
FIDUCIARY EXEMPTION FOR PUBLIC NECESSITY
C. Merger Execution and Fiduciary Duty
As a preliminary manner, the Bank poorly executed the Merrill acqui-
sition. The disclosure and procedural issues stand out: were the board and
the shareholders properly informed by the management, advisers, and the
merger proxy, respectively, when each approved the acquisition? Only find-
ings of facts or admissions on the extent of knowable information and the
scienter at the time can resolve these issues. I comment no further on the
disclosure and federal securities issues.'13 I assume that, as Lewis's testi-
mony suggests, the Bank learned of the accelerating pace of Merrill losses
after the shareholder vote on December 5, 2008, and that disclosure of ma-
terial facts up to this point-including the merger proxy, containing finan-
cial information dated October 30-was proper and thus the shareholder
vote was not tainted by faulty disclosure. Trial or admission on these issues
may later prove these assumptions wrong, but the disclosure issue is tan-
gential to the thesis of this Article, which advances a theory of fiduciary
exemption and offers a broader comment on shareholder primacy.
The duty of care with respect to the merger execution on September
13-15 is also tangential. This issue is relevant here only insofar as the qual-
ity of the due diligence may explain in part the Bank's board's later consid-
eration to terminate the deal, the event leading to the government's in-
volvement in the Bank's corporate governance. To develop this thought, I
assess the duty of care issue.
A board's decision must be informed and made in good faith. This re-
quirement calls into question the board's initial approval of the merger. The
113 As of the writing of this Article, issues pertaining to the disclosure issue are rapidly developing.
On August 3, 2009, the Bank settled for $33 million with the SEC on charges concerning misleading
and false disclosure to shareholders with respect to executive bonuses paid out as a part of the Merrill
acquisition. Zachery Kouwe, Bank of America Settles S.E.C. Suit Over Merrill Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 2009, at BI. However, the federal district court disapproved the settlement and ordered the case for
trial. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The opinion is notable for the
tone of the court's indignation:
Overall, indeed, the parties' submissions, when carefully read, leave the distinct impression
that the proposed Consent Judgment was a contrivance designed to provide the S.E.C. with
the facade of enforcement and the management of the Bank with a quick resolution of an
embarrassing inquiry-all at the expense of the sole alleged victims, the shareholders.
Id. at 510. Subsequently, the Bank and the SEC revised the proposed settlement to $150 million, and the
court approved the revised proposal. Louise Story, Judge Questions Bank ofAmerica's New Deal with
S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at B7. The shareholder derivative lawsuit in the Delaware Chancery
Court alleges a breach of fiduciary duty based on a failure to inform shareholders of Merrill's losses.
Derivative Complaint, supra note 7, 11-16. Moreover, on February 4, 2010, the New York Attorney
General filed civil fraud charges against the Bank, Lewis, and Joseph Price (the Bank's chief financial
officer at the time). Louise Story, Cuomo Sues Bank of America, Even as It Settles with S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010; see Complaint, Cuomo v. Bank of Am. Corp. et al., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010),
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/mediacenter/201 0/feb/BoAComplaint.pdf
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Delaware standard for the duty of care is gross negligence."4 With an in-
formed decision based on proper due diligence, the business judgment rule
would protect the board's decision to approve the merger."5 The decision of
the Bank's board constituted a high-risk strategic decision, and Delaware
courts would not engage in ex post analysis of an informed, good faith
judgment made under uncertainty even if the merger was poorly executed
or the outcome was poor."
6
However, the board's decision was not an informed one because the
procedure used to approve the Merrill acquisition was highly flawed. The
facts in the seminal decision, Smith v. Van Gorkom,"7 are informative.
There, the target company was undergoing a sale process." 8 The board was
found to have violated the duty of care based on several factors: a failure to
adequately inform itself of vital aspects of the deal, including the intrinsic
value of the company; approving the sale after only two hours of considera-
tion; and failure to read the deal documents because they were unavailable
at the board meeting.' The Delaware Supreme Court held that these facts
were sufficient to prove the board's gross negligence. 2 '
The publicly available facts suggest that the Bank's board was grossly
negligent in the process used to approve the Merrill acquisition. Indeed, the
board's negligence is qualitatively worse than the simple negligence in Van
Gorkom. 2' The obvious problem is the quality of the due diligence. The
merger agreement states that due diligence on the deal was conducted over
114 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler
v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
115 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that the business judgment rule
protects "directors of a corporation [who] acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company"), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
116 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (reasoning
that upon the proper application of the business judgment rule there is no ex post review of actions that
were "substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irra-
tional"').
117 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d
695 (Del. 2009); see also Gander, 965 A.2d at 713 (holding that shareholder ratification subjects "the
challenged director action to business judgment review, as opposed to 'extinguishing' the claim alto-
gether").
118 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
119 Id.at874.
120 Id. at 884.
121 See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassess-
ment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287, 1300 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Allen et al., Function Over Form] (arguing that the facts in Van Gorkom may have shown negligence
but not gross negligence); Scan J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (2005) ("The majority of commentators now agree
that on the merits the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Trans Union board had been
grossly negligent.").
[VOL. 17:3
FIDUCIARY EXEMPTION FOR PUBLIC NECESSITY
a period of a day and a half (Saturday afternoon to Sunday evening), about
thirty hours.' Such a short time period could not have been sufficient to
conduct adequate due diligence on a business as big and complex as Merrill
Lynch in normal times, let alone in a time of extreme market volatility and
crisis. Is it plausible that the Bank adequately reviewed within a matter of a
few hours asset quality, liabilities, trading positions, risk management struc-
tures, and values at risk, along with many other facets of the business? The
answer is certainly not. The two companies probably engaged armies of
internal and external lawyers, accountants, and bankers, and there was
probably frantic activity during the weekend, creating an illusion of due
diligence. But raw manpower can only do so much in a short time period;
reasonable due diligence entails contemplation and assimilation of informa-
tion learned. '23
The choice of financial advisers, no small decision, is also informative.
Merrill used its own investment bankers who delivered the fairness opin-
ion. 24 The Bank hired two financial advisers who delivered fairness opin-
ions: J.C. Flowers & Co., a private equity firm, and Fox-Pitt Kelton Coch-
ran Caronia Waller ("FPK"), a boutique investment bank specializing in
financial institutions.'25 A deal like the merger of the Bank and Merrill
would be a landmark transaction on Wall Street with huge investment bank-
ing fees (J.C. Flowers and FPK received a total of $20 million in fees). 126
The advisory work on these kinds of deals are usually handled by top-tier
investment banking firms, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, UBS
Warburg, Credit Suisse First Boston, JPMorgan Chase, or other comparable
firms. Why use one's own investment bankers as Merrill did, and a private
equity firm and a boutique investment bank as the Bank did, for such a
large complex deal?
One can speculate on several plausible explanations. J.C. Flowers had
experience in the restructuring of financial institutions. It was involved in
attempting to rescue Bear Steams only a few months before. 127 Because it is
122 This time is calculated from the time Lewis and Thain discussed a merger (Saturday, 2:30 p.m.)
to the time of the announcement of the deal (Sunday, 9:23 p.m.), less one hour for lag time in organizing
due diligence and other down time. Derivative Complaint, supra note 7, 64, 7 1.
123 1 draw from my own experience of conducting due diligence as an investment banker on a
complex, multi-billion dollar potential acquisition of an investment bank in 2000. My recollection was
that approximately seventy people were involved to varying degrees in the due diligence, which took
several weeks to complete.
124 MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, app. E. Query how objective this fairness opinion could have
been given the management's and board's support of the deal.
125 Id. apps. C, D. I note that I was a vice president of investment banking at FPK, where I worked
from 1999 to 2001. At that time, it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Swiss Reinsurance. Prior to this, I
was also an M&A banker at UBS Warburg.
126 ld. at68.
127 COHAN, supra note 16, at 85-88 (2009). J.C. Flowers was also involved in the turnaround of
Japan's Long Term Credit Bank. Id. at 85.
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a private equity firm, it did not compete with Merrill or the Bank on capital
markets and trading activities.'28 Both firms may have been concerned
about competitors gaining intelligence on their assets and liabilities and
trading book, which may have had enormous informational value during
unprecedented market turmoil. This is not to impugn the honesty or profes-
sionalism of investment bankers, but only to suggest that the risk of harmful
leaks, rumors, and misinformation may have been substantial and poten-
tially fatal in volatile markets. Even so, the companies could have used
other investment bankers who were not competitors in capital market activi-
ties, such as Lazard, a premier boutique mergers and acquisition advisor
with deep expertise in financial institutions." 9 Another plausible explana-
tion for why the boards of the Bank and Merrill used these advisers is that
perhaps the major investment banks did not want to run the risk of advising
on this deal under these situational constraints. There may have been sub-
stantial liability as well as reputational risks associated with the merger. At
the time, most large investment and money center banks were embroiled in
their own fights for survival.13 The prestige and the fees may not have been
worth exposing themselves to the legal risks of issuing a fairness opinion
under these constraints, necessitating the appointment of other financial
advisers who were more willing to undertake the risks for the fees and the
opportunity to work on a landmark deal.
Another point about due diligence is worth mentioning. It is standard
protocol that when rendering fairness opinions for a deal, investment bank-
ers do not independently assess the company's assets and liabilities. 3' Both
the FPK and J.C. Flowers fairness opinion letters have such a disclaimer.'32
128 Private equity firms make principal investments in firms or assets, which are held in a portfolio
for longer durations. They typically do not engage in trading of securities in a broker-dealer capacity as
full service investment banks do. Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L.
259, 260 (2010).
129 Lazard advised Bear Steams during its crisis and eventual merger with JPMorgan Chase. Id. at
73, 88-89.
130 See generally ANDREW RoSS SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES (2009)
(describing how Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs were in peril during the financial crisis).
131 Cf Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 155-56 (Del. 1997) (holding that
an investment banker need not calculate assets and liabilities separately in providing a solvency report to
the board).
132 The FPK fairness opinion letter provides the typical disclaimer on this specific point.
In rendering our opinion, we have assumed and relied, without independent verification,
upon the accuracy and completeness of all the information examined by, or otherwise re-
viewed or discussed with, us for purposes of this opinion. We have not made or obtained an
independent valuation or appraisal of the assets, liabilities (contingent, derivative, off-
balance sheet or otherwise) or solvency of the Company or Merrill Lynch, including particu-
larly any mark-to-market balance sheet adjustments resulting from the Merger, market condi-
tions or otherwise. We relied solely upon information provided to us by the Company and
other publicly available information with respect to Merrill Lynch's financial condition, re-
sults of operations and prospects.
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The specific disclaimer of non-verification of the company's assets and
liabilities is a standard term in fairness opinions.'33 If the financial advisers
were not analyzing the quality of the assets and liabilities, who were? While
the fairness opinions spoke to the value of the firm based on market met-
rics, including transaction and comparable companies multiples and dis-
counted cash flow ("DCF") analysis,' such top-down valuational analyses
are largely worthless under the extenuating circumstances. The value driv-
ers of the Bank-Merrill merger were not market metrics or theoretical out-
puts from a DCF model. They were instead the fair values of assets and
liabilities, which could only have been determined by a bottom-up, inde-
pendent assessment of the firm's internal books. The crisis posed unique
valuational issues. For instance, in a failing market system the "fair value"
may not necessarily have been the "fair market value" per mark-to-market
pricing.'35 There could have been a significant divergence between the
"hold" and the "sale" values of exotic and illiquid security with enormous
uncertainty as to the former, thus discounting the latter value. Valuation
would have required a bottom-up cash flow analysis of the individual assets
and liabilities, and calculations of both the "hold" and the "sale" values.
When markets are highly unstable or severely malfunctioning, the indices
of price reflected in standard market and theoretical valuation techniques
cannot possibly form the basis for a fairness opinion, and at least the use of
the typical fairness opinion should not provide legal cover for a lack of
common sense. 1
36
Only a deal team with proper skills and sufficient time could have per-
formed a bottom-up analysis of the internal books, which is the only way
reasonable due diligence could have been done when there is a significant
MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, app. D. Clearly, other aspects of this fairness opinion letter are custom
tailored to the unique situation of this merger: for example, the specific reference to "contingent, deriva-
tive, off-balance sheet or otherwise." Id. J.C. Flowers' fairness opinion also provides: "We have as-
sumed and relied upon the accuracy and completeness of the information . . . provided by each of the
Company and the Acquiror. We did not independently verify the accuracy or completeness of any such
information, nor will we do so in the future, and we did not and do not assume any responsibility for
doing so." Id. app. C.
133 See, e.g., FARM FAMILY HOLDINGS & AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION,
MERGER PROXY 22 (2001) ("Fox-Pitt, Kelton did not assume any responsibility for the independent
valuation or appraisal of our assets and liabilities nor was it furnished with any such valuation or ap-
praisal.").
134 MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, at 63-68.
135 Mark-to-market is an accounting rule that requires certain assets, such as securities, be stated at
their fair value rather than historical cost. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 157: FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS (2008).
136 In analyzing the fairness opinion given in the Bear Steams deal, William Cohan, a former
investment banker, opined: "Given that the choice was between about $290 million for the 145.5 million
Bear shares outstanding and nothing, Lazard's fairness opinion was not a hard one to give... rais[ing]
the question of why corporate boards agree to pay so much money for a couple of pieces of paper that
are of so little value." COHAN, supra note 16, at 109.
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possibility that the target is a distressed financial institution. A few months
before, JPMorgan Chase found itself in a similar situation with the rushed,
crisis-precipitated acquisition of Bear Steams. During due diligence occur-
ring over a single weekend, resembling the circumstance of the Merrill ac-
quisition, it appeared that JPMorgan Chase would not proceed with the
deal. 3 7 A Bear Steams board member commented on this apparent devel-
opment: "If I were Jamie Dimon [JPMorgan Chase's CEO], I would have
had some concerns myself because you never do a deal as big as that on one
day's due diligence. What's the upside versus the downside?"'38 Notably,
JPMorgan Chase continued with the Bear Steams acquisition only with
government financial support and risk sharing arrangements.'39 To suggest
that the Bank fully assessed Merrill within a matter of a few hours during
extraordinary circumstances is a bridge too far.14 The deviation from what
is reasonable under the circumstances here is so great that executing the
merger agreement while essentially blind to the underlying values of the
assets and liabilities of a business as complex as Merrill meets the demand-
ing standard of gross negligence and perhaps even reckless dereliction of
duty.'' This is a far greater transgression than Jason Van Gorkom's execu-
tion of the merger agreement at the Chicago Lyric Opera, which was
largely a problem of optics.'
Although the Bank's board was grossly negligent in executing the ac-
quisition, it would not be liable in fact. The decision in Smith v. Van
137 Id. at 95.
138 Id. (quoting Fred Salerno). JPMorgan Chase was able to proceed with the deal despite the
problem of proper due diligence only because it received unprecedented financial assistance from the
government, including among other things a $30 billion secured loan. Id. at 101.
139 Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank Merger Reform Takes an Extended Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 695 (2008).
140 Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke Defends Role on Merrill, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at BI
(quoting a December 19, 2009, e-mail from Timothy P. Clark, Senior Adviser of the Division of Bank-
ing Supervision and Regulation at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to senior
officials at the Federal Reserve). "I always had my doubts about the quality of due diligence they did on
the [Merrill] deal." Id. (quoting a December 20, 2009, e-mail from Deborah P. Bailey, Deputy Director
of the Banking Supervision and Regulation Division at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System). "I think he is worried about stockholder lawsuits; knows they did not do a good job of due
diligence and the issues facing the company are finally hitting home and he is worried about his own job
after cutting loose lots of very good people." Lauren Tara LaCapra, BofA CEO Lewis Not Offthe Hook,
THESTREET.cOM, June 25, 2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10526439/2/bofa-ceo-lewis-not-off-
the-hook.html (quoting a December 23, 2009, e-mail from Mac Alfriend, Senior Vice President in the
Supervision, Regulation, and Credit Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond).
141 The failure of corporate governance probably led to the radical board and management changes
at the Bank after the Merrill deal closed. See infra note 152.
142 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 879 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler
v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
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Gorkom resulted in the enactment of DGCL section 102(b)(7). 143 This stat-
ute allows for a provision in the certificate of incorporation eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director for monetary damages for breach
of the duty of care. 144 The Bank, a Delaware corporation, has such an excul-
patory provision.'45
With the deal execution in context, we can synthesize the operative
facts concerning the Bank board's actions in mid-December 2008-after, as
this Article assumes, the board, the Federal Reserve, and shareholders ap-
proved the deal.
The Merrill acquisition had a profound link to the financial markets.
The government coerced the Bank's board and management to close the
merger. This threat was credible because federal banking agencies have the
power to remove a corporation's board and management upon a showing
that they engaged in unsafe or unsound practice resulting in financial loss or
probable loss.'46 The government was motivated by the need to stem further
harm to the financial market, the most immediate problem being a collapse
of Merrill on the heels of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
Lewis's and the board's motivations are more ambiguous. Viewed nar-
rowly in terms of deal economics, closing the acquisition was financially
bad for shareholders since the company assumed far greater, multi-billion
dollar losses than it had expected.'47 Like many classic corporate law cases,
the motivations of the board and Lewis, acting in his capacity both as CEO
143 WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 256-57 (3d ed. 2009).
144 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008).
145 Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of BankAmerica Corporation at 25 (Mar.
29, 2004), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.netlExtemal.File?item=UGFyZW5OSUQ9MzMONTR8Q2
hpbGRJRDOtMXxUeXBIPTM=&t= 1. Section (c)(1)(6) provides: "To the fullest extent permitted by the
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, as the same exists or may hereafter be amended,
a director of the Corporation shall not be personally liable to the Corporation, its shareholders or
otherwise for monetary damage for breach of his duty as a director." Id.
146 An appropriate federal banking agency can act "to remove [any institutional-affiliated] party
from office or to prohibit any further participation by such party, in any manner, in the conduct of the
affairs of any insured depository institution." 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) (2000). The banking authority
must show unsafe conduct, injury or likelihood of injury to the bank, and moral turpitude or scienter. Id.
The Federal Reserve is a federal banking authority under the statute. Id. § 1813(z). An institutional-
affiliated party includes "any director, officer, employee." Id. § 1813(u)(1). See also William J. Sweet,
Jr. & Stacie E. McGinn, Financial Holding Company Regulation, 1206 PLI/CORP 465, 499 (Sept. 2000)
("In addition, the Federal Reserve has authority to remove or suspend officers, directors and employ-
ees."). Bemanke testified that the Federal Reserve can make or recommend changes in management, but
it cannot do so "unconditionally" and must show that poor management damaged the company. Ber-
nanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 88. As it turned out in 2009 at the time of writing this
Article, many board members as well as Lewis subsequently resigned or announced their resignation
after the deal closed and the dust from the controversy somewhat settled. See infra note 152 and accom-
panying text.
147 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
2010]
GEO. MASON L. REV.
and chairman of the board, do not sort into tidy categories or neat charac-
terizations. The episode is colored in shades of gray, and one must engage
in some degree of plausible speculation.
The board minutes plainly state that the government's threat did not
influence the board members,'48 though such self-serving notice, by itself,
cannot be taken seriously. The cynic is sometimes wise. The board was
aware of the potential for shareholder derivative or federal securities litiga-
tion. The board minutes state that Lewis recommended not invoking the
MAC because the government told him not to do so, and he changed his
mind only in response to Paulson's threat. 4 9 Internal e-mails at the Federal
Reserve show that Lewis was concerned about lawsuits and sought to use
the government's position as a legal defense. Scott Alvarez, the general
counsel of the Federal Reserve, wrote in an e-mail:
[Lewis] said he now fears lawsuits from shareholders for NOT invoking the MAC, given the
deterioration at [Merrill]. I don't think that's very likely and said so. However, he still asked
whether he could use as a defense that the govt [sic] ordered him to proceed for systemic rea-
sons. I said no. It is true, however, that we have done analyses that indicate that not going
through with the merger would pose important risks to [the Bank] itself. So here's my ques-
tion: Can the supervisors formally advise him that a MAC is not in the best interest of his
company? If we did, could he cite that in defense if he did get sued for not pursuing a
MAC?'O
In a subsequent e-mail, Alvarez wrote to Bernanke:
All that said, I don't think it's necessary or appropriate for us to give Lewis a letter
along the lines he asked. First, we didn't order him to go forward-we simply explained our
views on what the market reaction would be and left the decision to him. Second, making
hard decisions is what he gets paid for and only he has the full information needed to make
the decision-so we shouldn't take him off the hook by appearing to take the decision out of
his hands.'
51
These e-mails show that the consideration of legal risk was a significant
factor in explaining the behavior of Lewis and the board. They also raise
the possibility that the purported purpose of providing government aid can
possibly be used as a defense to a charge of breach of fiduciary duty.
In light of Lewis's concern about litigation, it is possible that he con-
sidered terminating the deal, whether contractually sound or not, because
Merrill's losses were exposing the failure of due diligence. This bad out-
come called into serious question the competence of the management and
148 Board Minutes of Dec. 22, 2008, supra note 60, at 3.
149 See supra Part I.A.
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the board. 52 Recall that the Bank had the superior bargaining leverage on
September 13 when Lewis and Thain negotiated the deal, but nevertheless
paid a 70 percent premium for Merrill, which would then go on to lose over
$15 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008.
A flawed due diligence may also be the basis for another explanation.
Faced with a badly executed and overpriced deal of his own fault, Lewis
may have shrewdly tried to salvage a bad situation by threatening to invoke
the MAC, legal basis notwithstanding. He coerced a frightened government
to make financial commitments, which the Bank in fact got as a part of
closing the Merrill deal. 153 In the end, the government also made sure that
Lewis and the board paid a personal price for this deception.' 54 This expla-
nation suggests that invoking the MAC was not a serious possibility after
all, but merely a stalking horse. There are no heroes in this tale, only people
making imperfect decisions and exercising bad judgment in extraordinary
times and market conditions.
152 Bernanke questioned the management's and the board's competence. Bemanke Congressional
Testimony, supra note 45.
153 See STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY DEAL,
AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 268 (2009) ("This may have been Lewis' strategy all along-
knowing the weakness of his [legal] claim he claimed a MAC to win government support."). Bemanke
had suspected that Lewis was threatening to invoke the MAC as leverage to extract additional govem-
ment financial aid, and only later did he believe Lewis was genuinely concerned about the deterioration
of Merrill's financial situation. Bemanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45. In his memoir,
Paulson seems to agree. PAULSON, supra note 99, at 429 ("Since we had been so clear about our com-
mitment to a government support program, I doubted that Ken was just testing us."). But he also recalls
that
Ken raised the idea of using the clause to renegotiate the terms of the deal with Merrill, and I
answered that this would cause the same concerns as invoking the MAC to get out of the
deal: it would create an extended period of uncertainty in a market that already was being
driven by fear.
Id.
154 After the deal closed, the Federal Reserve required the Bank to review its top management, and
the company made substantial changes to the board. Bemanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45.
Regulators imposed a secret sanction against the Bank that called for board restructuring (and perhaps
other undisclosed conditions), and as a result the board composition has undergone a wholesale change.
Dan Fitzpatrick, U.S. Regulators to BofA: Obey or Else, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, at CI (noting that
as of April 29, 2009, seven board members left and were replaced by four new board members). As of
July 31, 2009, ten board members left. Bank of America Exits Include 3 More Directors, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2009, at B2. When asked why Lewis was not replaced, Bemanke answered: "Our judgment at
the time was that he could continue to lead the company .... Obviously, we'll continue to evaluate
management and the board as we go forward and make sure that we're comfortable with the leadership
at Bank of America." Bemanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45, at 49. The practical reality
was probably that replacing the board and management in the middle of a crisis may not have been the
most prudent thing to do. Moreover, finding capable managers and directors may not be done so
quickly. Ultimately, Ken Lewis also decided to resign early for reasons associated with the Merrill
Lynch merger and conflicts with government regulators. Carrick Mollenkamp & Dan Fitzpatrick, With
Feds, BofA's Lewis Met His Match, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at Al.
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The theory of covering up a badly-executed deal finds additional sup-
port in internal machinations involving the Bank's senior managers. Timo-
thy Mayopoulos, the Bank's former general counsel, testified to the events
leading to his termination.'55 The timeline is telling. On November 12,
2008, he was given a written projection showing that Merrill would lose
approximately $5 billion in the fourth quarter.'56 On November 20, the sen-
ior management, including Mayopoulos, concluded that the $5 billion pro-
jected loss need not be disclosed to shareholders.'57 On December 1, senior
executives, including the chief financial officer ("CFO"), asked Mayopou-
los to review the MAC in the merger agreement, and Mayopoulos advised
that there was no material adverse change because, among other reasons,
Merrill's performance was not disproportionately worse than other firms,
including the Bank's. 56 On December 3, Mayopoulos learned that Merrill's
losses were estimated to be $7 billion.'59 On December 9, he attended a
board meeting and there learned that this estimate had increased to $9 bil-
lion. 60 On December 10, he was fired per Lewis's order.'6' Subsequently,
Brian Moynihan assumed the role of general counsel, and he opined that the
Bank had a valid case to invoke the MAC.'62 Presumably, with this new
advice, Lewis was able to represent to Paulson during their December 17
conversation that he was considering invoking the MAC, whereas he could
not credibly do so if his general counsel had advised him there was no ma-
terial adverse change.'63
Lewis's use of the MAC as leverage to coerce financial aid is the dark
view of the board's motive. However, Lewis is only one board member,
albeit the most important, and there are a number of other plausible expla-
nations for the board's decision to close the deal. The board could have
been intimidated and unduly influenced by the government. It could have
155 Oversight Committee Hearing, Part IV, supra note 63 (prepared statement of Timothy J. May-





160 Id. Recall that the actual fourth-quarter loss would ultimately be $15.3 billion. Id.
161 Oversight Committee Hearing, Part IV, supra note 63 (prepared testimony of Timothy J. May-
opoulos, Former General Counsel, Bank of Am. Corp.).
162 See id. Apparently, Moynihan had not practiced law in ten years and was not licensed at the
time. Id. Effective January 1, 2010, he succeeded Lewis as the Bank's CEO. Press Release, Bank of Am.
Corp., Bank of America Board of Directors Elects Brian Moynihan CEO (Dec. 16, 2009), available at
http://ahead.bankofamerica.com/company-performance/bank-of-america-news.
163 There is some controversy concerning the advice that the Bank's outside counsel, Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, gave to the company and regulators. Apparently, Wachtell advised the Bank on
December 19, 2008, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to terminate the deal with Merrill. Zach
Lowe, Wachtell Under Fire, AMLAw DAILY, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.
com/amlawdaily/2009/10/wachtell-under-fire.html. However, a few hours later, it told regulators that
the Bank could legally terminate the deal. Id.
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decided to go through with the deal, as the minutes suggest, based on the
best interest of the corporation and its shareholders. It could have exercised
independent judgment and reasonably deferred to the expert advice of regu-
lators based on broader considerations of systemic risk and public welfare,
which were intimately related to the best interest of the company in the long
term though current shareholders suffered in the short term. Lastly, in a
complex situation and under stress, perhaps the most likely explanation is
that the board acted with mixed motive, taking all of these factors into con-
sideration with each board member assigning different weights to them to
come to a collective decision: their entrenchment interest, their desire to
remedy a poorly executed deal, the pecuniary interest of shareholders, the
long-term interest of the corporation, the financial markets, systemic risk,
good faith belief in the expertise of regulators, and the public welfare.'64
D. Merger Closing and Fiduciary Duty
If the merger execution was flawed, was the decision to close a flawed
merger also problematic? In the December 22 board meeting, the Bank's
board made three important decisions: (1) not to exercise the MAC; (2) not
to renegotiate the purchase price; and (3) not to inform shareholders of ac-
celerating losses at Merrill before closing of the deal.'65 Upon an informed
decision, the board would be entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule absent disloyalty or bad faith.'66 There would be a loyalty
problem if, for example, the board decided not to renegotiate or terminate
the deal based on a conflict of interest, such as the desire to avoid scrutiny
of its initial flawed decision to approve the merger, or to entrench its inter-
est by acquiescing to the government's demand to close the deal in response
164 Consider this testimony from one board member:
[F]or me the key decision was not the government threatening board seats because, if that
were the key, then I would not be doing my fiduciary duty. The key was the uncertainty of
the MAC, to litigate a MAC, to walk away and say we're not going to close. The uncertainty
of whether we'd win was a lose-lose for the Bank of America shareholders.
See Oversight Committee Hearing, Part IV, supra note 63 (testimony of Charles Gifford, Member, Bank
of America Board of Directors).
165 These decisions, technically inactions or omissions, come within the purview of the business
judgment rule because the contrary action (exercising the MAC) was contemplated and rejected in favor
of a conscious inaction leading to the scheduled closing of the deal. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 813 (Del. 1984) ("[A] conscious decision to refrain from acting may nonetheless be a valid exercise
of business judgment...."), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000);
cf In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that "in instances
where directors have not exercised business judgment, that is, in the event of director inaction, the
protections of the business judgment rule do not apply"), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
166 The presumption of the business judgment rule applies when these two questions are answered
affirmatively: Did the board reach its decision in good faith pursuant to a legitimate corporate interest?
Did the board do so advisedly? See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009).
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to a threat of removal. Let us proceed on the factual assumption that the
board's decision was informed, but that the board was conflicted or not
independent. The loyalty issue would still have a serious causation prob-
lem: that is, whether the board even had the legal option to invoke the MAC
at this time.
Found in most merger agreements, a MAC allocates the risk of an ad-
verse event between signing and closing, and is one of the most important
clauses in a merger agreement. 16 7 The provision in the Bank-Merrill merger
agreement defines a "material adverse effect" as "a material adverse effect
on (i) the financial condition, results of operations or business of such party
and its Subsidiaries taken as a whole ... or (ii) the ability of such party to
timely consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement."'68
This definition has a significant carve-out:
"Material Adverse Effect" shall not be deemed to include effects to the extent resulting from
... changes in ... general business, economic or market conditions, including changes gen-
erally in prevailing interest rates, currency exchange rates, credit markets and price levels or
trading volumes in the United States or foreign securities markets, in each case generally af-
fecting the industries in which such party or its Subsidiaries operate and including changes to
any previously correctly applied asset marks resulting therefrom.., except.., to the extent
that the effects of such change are disproportionately adverse to the financial condition, re-
sults of operations or business of such party and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, as com-
pared to other companies in the industry in which such party and its Subsidiaries operate
169
This definition excludes changes in "general business, economic or market
conditions, including changes generally in... credit markets and price lev-
els or trading volumes in . . . securities markets,"'70 but imports back into
the definition of material adverse effect changes that are "disproportion-
ately adverse... as compared to other companies in the industry."''
This carve-out most probably would cover the deterioration of asset
quality on Merrill's portfolio. It is clear that the worsening condition of the
167 DAVIDOFF, supra note 153, at 55-56. See generally Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal
Risk: Allocating Risk through MAC Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2007 (2009); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisi-
tion, 21 J.L. & ECON. & ORG. 330 (2005); Jonathan M. Grech, Comment, "Opting Out": Defining the
Material Adverse Change Clause in a Volatile Economy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1483 (2003).
168 MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, app. A, at A-13 to A-14. The MAC is found in the merger
agreement.
169 Id.
170 Id. at A-13. This carve-out from a MAC is typical. See DAVIDOFF, supra note 153 tbl.3.1, at 60
(noting that 89 percent of MACs exclude "change in the economy or business in general" and 70 percent
exclude "changes in general conditions of the specific industry" (citing Dominick DeChiara, Ronelle
Porter & Manuel Abascal, MAC Survey: A Nixon Peabody Study of Current Negotiation Trends of
Material Adverse Change Clauses in M&A Transactions, NIXON PEABODY PRIVATE EQUITY
NEWSLETTER, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.nixonpeabody.com/publicationsdetail3.asp?ID-2474)).
171 MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, app. A, at A-14.
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capital markets directly caused Merrill's losses. This situation is specifi-
cally carved out of the definition of material adverse effect. The Bank could
have argued that Merrill had previously marked its assets incorrectly. How-
ever, this is a matter of past due diligence, and the MAC is a forward-
looking provision addressing a change in condition after the signing. It
would have been difficult to argue that Merrill's changes were dispropor-
tionately adverse as compared to other companies. Merrill was one of only
five independent investment banks remaining after the industry consolida-
tion of the 1990s, the others being Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Leh-
man Brothers, and Bear Stearns. "' By the time Merrill was accruing the
losses in question, Bear Steams and Lehman Brother, two true peers of
Merrill, had already succumbed to the crisis, and Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley were struggling to survive.' Most other major financial
institutions with investment banking or trading activities, such as Citigroup,
AIG, and UBS, were also highly distressed.'74 Importantly, as well, the
Bank was also distressed, and Merrill's situation was arguably no more
adverse than the Bank's.'75 By this time as well, the government forced the
leading financial institutions, including Merrill and the Bank, to accept
TARP funding.'7 6 Extreme distress in financial condition was the norm in
the investment banking and financial institutions sector, which is not sur-
prising given that their distress triggered the worldwide economic crisis."'
172 In the post-Glass-Steagall Act era, most investment banks were acquired by large commercial
banks: for example, UBS Warburg and Credit Suisse First Boston. The acquisitions of Bear Steams by
JPMorgan Chase, Merrill by the Bank, and Lehman Brothers by Barclays continue this trend. Currently,
there are only two pure investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, and these firms have
converted to bank holding companies in 2008 during the height of the financial crisis. Rhee, supra note
11, at 77.
173 See generally SORKIN, supra note 130.
174 See Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 2008, at A l; Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer's Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at Al; Nelson D. Schwartz & Julia Werdigier, UBS to Write Down
Another $19 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at Al.
175 On a comparative basis, the Bank's stock price underperformed Merrill's for the time period
September 15 to December 31, 2008. On September 15, the closing stock prices were: the Bank $26.55,
and Merrill $13.80. On December 31, the closing stock prices were: the Bank $14.08, and Merrill
$15.83. See Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). There is much in-
formation incorporated into the stock, and one such factor here must be the assumption of Merrill's
losses by the Bank through the merger, which partially explains the relative stock performance. Never-
theless, the point still holds that the Bank was not in a qualitatively superior position to Merrill during a
systemic financial crisis the effects from which no financial institution escaped. See infra note 177 and
accompanying text.
176 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
177 The Bank's general counsel at the time did not believe that it had a MAC because the Bank was
in a similarly distressed state:
[l]n order for there to be a material adverse change, there had to be an event that had oc-
curred that had a disproportionate impact on Merrill Lynch in contrast to other companies in
the industry, including Bank of America. And as I discussed with Mr. Price, the stock price
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The MAC was written into the Bank-Merrill merger agreement on
September 14-15, 2008, at a time when the financial markets were becom-
ing highly unstable.'78 The merger consideration was a stock exchange,
which meant that the market values of both Merrill and the Bank were sub-
ject to fluctuations in the value of their assets. The parties clearly under-
stood that market volatility would likely affect the deal price, but each party
equally assumed this risk. Although Merrill suffered heavy losses, they did
not constitute materially adverse changes as defined in the merger agree-
ment.
No Delaware case has upheld the exercise of a MAC, and this is the
result of a deliberate policy choice.'79 A recent Delaware case, Hexion Spe-
cialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.,8' which involved a material
change experienced during the recent economic crisis, is illustrative. This
case demonstrates the challenge the Bank would have faced in a contract
dispute with Merrill. There, an acquirer was disappointed with the expected
financial performance of the target, which was affected by the economic
crisis of 2008.181 The merger agreement defined a material adverse effect as
"any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect that is materially ad-
verse to the financial condition, business, or results of operations," but there
is no materially adverse event if "any occurrence, condition, change, event
or effect resulting from or relating to changes in general economic or finan-
cial market conditions" occurs.'82 After signing the merger agreement in
July 2007, the target suffered in the second half of 2007: a 22 percent short-
fall from projections made in June 2007; a 20 percent decline in earnings
before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization ("EBITDA") in the first
half of 2008 from the previous year's results; and, as of early August 2008,
a projected 32 percent decrease for the forecast year 2008 from 2007 re-
sult.'83 These are substantial deteriorations of financial performance.
The court of chancery held that no material adverse event occurred.'84
When a target company's financials deteriorate, the standard is "whether
at Bank of America had declined almost as much as Merrill Lynch's. Bank of America had
gone out and raised substantial capital. It cut its dividend. Its eaming[s] had been reduced. So
basically, both companies had suffered significant downturns in their prospects in the time
since the merger had been announced.
Oversight Committee Hearing, Part IV, supra note 63 (testimony of Timothy J. Mayopoulos, General
Counsel, Bank of Am. Corp.).
178 MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, at 50-51.
179 Hexion Specialty Chems, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008). See also
In re IBP, Inc. S'holder Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 71 (Del. Ch. 2001) (contract governed by New York law);
Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. Civ. A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *34 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29,
2005).
180 965 A.2d 715 (Del Ch. 2008).
181 Id. at 721.
182 Id. at 736.
183 Id. at 740.
184 Id.
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there has been an adverse change in the target's business that is consequen-
tial to the company's long-term earnings power over a commercially rea-
sonable period, which one would expect to be measured in years rather than
months."'85 A MAC protects against the occurrence of unknown events that
substantially threaten to produce poor earnings significantly into the future,
and not against "short-term hiccup[s] in earnings." '86 As the court noted,
"[i]f Hexion wanted the short-term forecasts of Huntsman warranted by
Huntsman, it could have negotiated for that. It could have tried to negotiate
a lower base price and something akin to an earn-out, based not on Hunts-
man's post-closing performance but on its performance between signing
and closing."'87
Another Delaware case, In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,8' is
also a helpful reference. There, material adverse effect was defined as:
[A]ny event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or facts which has had or
reasonably could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect ... on the condition (finan-
cial or otherwise), business, assets, liabilities or results of operations of [the target] and [its]
Subsidiaries taken as a whole.... "'
The first quarter of the target's earnings ran 64 percent behind the compa-
rable prior year's period. 90 Applying New York law, the court of chancery
found the issue "a close one" and concluded that the outcome hinged on the
burden and standard of proof.'9 ' The court ultimately found that the target
was a consistently profitable company, but profits were erratic and the
company was struggling to implement a strategy to reduce cyclicality of
earnings."' Although the target may not have performed as well as the ac-
quirer had hoped, it appeared to be in sound enough shape to deliver results
in line with its recent historical performance.'93 According to the court, the
acquirer did not meet the burden of proof and thus did not have the right to
invoke the MAC.'9 4
The Hexion standard under Delaware law is a heavy burden. Absent a
clear contractual intent, Delaware courts would be wary of recognizing a
right to terminate a deal based on a material adverse event because such a
precedent would cause great mischief in mergers and acquisitions struck
185 Id. at 738.
186 Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d at 738.
187 Id. at 741 (footnote omitted).
188 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001).
189 Id. at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
190 Id. at 69.
191 Id. at 68, 71, 72 n.172. The acquirer seeking to terminate the agreement had the burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 54.
192 Id. at 71.
193 id.
194 In re IBP, 789 A.2d at 71 (contract governed by New York law).
20101
GEO. MASON L. REv.
during economic downturns and market crises, which would convert
buyer's remorse into litigation risk.'95 Clearly, both the Bank and Merrill,
sophisticated market participants advised by top law firms,196 had antici-
pated financial adversity and volatility in the period between the deal's
signing and closing. This explains why the MAC carved out an exception
for adverse effects resulting from decline in general economic or market
conditions, and specifically changes in the capital markets. The magnitude
of Merrill's loss may have been disappointing to the Bank, and in this re-
spect, outside of the bounds of hopeful expectation; but the possibility of
large losses were certainly contemplated.
If the Bank was concerned about financial deterioration from signing
to closing, it could have contractually protected itself with tighter condi-
tions. Attempting to put a collar around the range of loss would have been
extremely difficult to negotiate given the volatility of the market.197 The
stock exchange ratio (0.8595 shares of the Bank's stock for each share of
Merrill stock) did not contain a collar or a repricing mechanism. There may
be several reasons why a collar or repricing mechanism was not used, but
one explanation is that the parties understood that a highly volatile market
could undermine the deal if it was subject to repricing or was terminable
upon exceeding collar limits. The lack of a collar could have been a bond to
close the deal, that is, a commitment to forego future options to back out of
the deal. Once an exchange ratio is fixed, Merrill's stock price becomes
loosely pegged to the Bank's. We can infer that contractual terms typically
used to limit the parties' risk would have dramatically increased the likeli-
hood of complication or termination prior to close, which is something ex
ante neither contracting parties would have wanted. The parties fixed a
price upon contract signing, and they took the price risk with respect to the
consideration as they saw it at the time. The MAC did not allow for a ter-
mination of the merger agreement based on changes in market conditions
clearly anticipated by the parties at signing.
195 "By erecting a hard rule in prior and future cases, the Delaware courts ensure that parties who
really want to avoid this problem will draft around it. Moreover, this will ensure that the MAC clause is
not triggered by systemic risk, risk that cannot be avoided." DAVIDOFF, supra note 153, at 75. Economi-
cally astute courts realize that contractual uncertainty in financial transactions increase the cost of doing
transactions and thereby inject unnecessary cost. See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982).
196 The Bank was represented by Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, and Merrill was represented by
Shearman & Sterling. Press Release, Merrill Lynch & Co., Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch, Creat-
ing Unique Financial Services Firm (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ml.com/?id=7695_
7696 8149 88278 106886_108117.
197 A collar in a stock exchange merger typically puts a ceiling and a floor on the implied value of
the firms based on stock price, and readjusts the exchange ratio based on a stock price that exceeds the
ceiling or floor. See Kathleen P. Fuller, Why Some Firms Use Collar Offers in Mergers, 38 FINANCIAL
REV. 127 (2003).
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Merrill's $15 billion loss in the fourth quarter was staggering, but it
may be merely an indication of extreme market volatility during that same
time period.'98 According to an 8-K filing, its losses included: credit valua-
tion adjustments related to monoline financial guarantor exposures of $3.22
billion; goodwill impairments of $2.31 billion, and the writedowns on lev-
eraged loans of $1.92 billion; U.S. Bank Investment Securities Portfolio of
$1.16 billion; and commercial real estate of $1.13 billion.'9 9 These losses
totaled $9.74 billion in valuational adjustments to the assets on the existing
portfolio, but they stemmed from Merrill's existing balance sheet and did
not indicate a material deterioration of Merrill's forward business prospects.
In fact, the losses proved to be short-term (as of the writing of this Article),
and Merrill returned to profitability though it has been erratic.2 °° Impor-
tantly, temporary shortfalls in expectation do not constitute material adverse
events. Therefore, the Bank did not have sound basis for invoking the
MAC, and the government's advice against such a maneuver was correct.
Without a material adverse event, the board could not have terminated
the merger, or credibly renegotiated the price. In ordinary times, perhaps
the Bank could have attempted to invoke the MAC to renegotiate the
merger consideration even with a low-probability legal hand. 20' Frivolous
cases are sometimes settled for positive value, especially when the holder of
the legal right is vulnerable.2 2 But an attempt to do so in these circum-
stances would have injected significant systemic risk into the financial sys-
tem as Paulson testified: "[I]t would be unthinkable for Bank of America to
take this destructive action for which there was no reasonable legal basis
and which would show a lack of judgment. 2 °3
198 See Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp, 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008) ("A
short-term hiccup in earnings should not suffice . (quoting In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789
A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001))).
199 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 13 (Jan. 16, 2009). The "Monoline guaran-
tee" refers to bond insurance, presumably issued by Merrill. Much of the financial crisis was triggered
by a precipitous decline in the bond values associated with mortgage-backed securities, which had a
cascading effect on the various financial transactions wrapped around these securities, such as a deriva-
tives and bond insurance products. See Rhee, supra note I1, at 92-93.
200 In the first quarter ended March 31,2009, Merrill contributed $3.66 billion of the Bank's $12.5
billion in net income. Merrill Lynch & Co., Quartely Report (Form I0-Q), at 2 (May 7, 2009); Bank of
Am. Corp., Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q), at 85-86 (May 7, 2009). As of the six months ended June 30,
2009, Merrill contributed $2.26 billion in net income (the firm lost money in the second quarter). Merrill
Lynch & Co., Quartely Report (Form I0-Q), at 7 (Aug. 7, 2009). By way of comparison, in the previous
year's six months ended June 27, 2008, a period before the full brunt of the financial crisis hit in the fall
of 2008, Merrill lost $8.51 billion. Id.
201 See DAVIDOFF, supra note 153, at 62 ("[T]he ambiguous wording of the MAC drives the parties
toward settlement of their dispute, albeit at a lower, negotiated price.").
202 See Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 517 (2009).
203 Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 88, at 5.
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Given the absence of a viable legal option, neither the shareholders nor
the board could have taken any action to avoid the losses and thus the board
had no fiduciary duty under state law to disclose the Merrill losses, how-
ever material, outside of whatever SEC obligations there were.2 °" At the
time, market volatility affected the values of assets and liabilities on a day-
to-day, mark-to-market basis.205 The internal estimations of Merrill's losses
were changing day-to-day in swings of billions of dollars.2"6 These wild
swings in estimates caused the buyer's remorse. In this situation, the effi-
cacy of disclosure wholly breaks down because one day's accurate disclo-
sure could very well have been the next day's inaccurate information. What
if the board disclosed a $12 billion estimated loss on a Monday, and on
Friday this estimation increased to $15 billion? The board must have real-
ized the potentially grave harm the corporation risked sustaining if it volun-
tarily disclosed certain financial information about Merrill's mounting
losses.20 7 Voluntary disclosure of bad news in an unstable market may have
resulted in greater harm to both corporations and to a financial market al-
ready in peril. These were unprecedented times in the capital markets.
When Paulson threatened to fire the Bank's management and board,
the threat created a potential loyalty problem. It is plausible that the board
did not act independently and its members were conflicted. Under Delaware
law, a director is independent if she decides on the merits of the transaction
rather than on extraneous considerations.2 8 Independence is inconsistent
with dominion or control by an individual or entity interested in the transac-
tions. 29 A director has a conflict of interest if she will be materialy affected
by a board's decision, in a manner not shared by the corporation and the
shareholders.210 Self-interest includes a desire for entrenchment.211 It is not
enough that a contrary decision could result in a loss of position; other facts
indicting a disloyal motive must be shown.2 2 A credible, articulated, direct
204 Metro Commc'n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 153 (Del.
Ch. 2004). See also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) ("The Directors of a Delaware corpo-
ration are required to disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board's control when it
seeks shareholder action.").
205 See text accompanying supra notes 51, 153-55.
206 id.
207 See Malone, 722 A.2d at 12; Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 85 (Del. 1992).
208 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. Ch. 1995). See also
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 (Del. 1993) ("[T]he board must be able to act free of personal
financial interest and improper extraneous influences.").
209 Seminaris, 662 A.2d at 1354; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816; Rales, 634 A.2d at 935.
210 Seminaris, 662 A.2d at 1354.
211 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del.
1988), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55, 958 (Del. 1985).
212 Gantler, 965 A.2d at 707.
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threat of termination would probably suffice to show a potential loyalty
problem.1 3
The facts established through testimony are: Lewis wanted to exercise
the MAC; 2t4 Paulson threatened that to do so would result in the termination
of the board and management; upon management's recommendation, which
was based on "instructions" from the government, the board did not invoke
the MAC. These facts plausibly suggest three scenarios: (1) Lewis and the
board hoodwinked the government with the threat of invoking a low-
probability legal strategy with a high probability of large collateral harm if
the threat was carried out in an effort to coax public financial aid; (2) upon
reconsideration after receipt of the government's strongly termed advice,
the board was persuaded by the government's rationale and they exercised
independent judgment not to invoke the MAC consistent with the govern-
ment's reasoning to proceed with closing the merger; or (3) the board
lacked independence and simply acquiesced to the government's demand.
Negotiations ethics aside, the first decision advanced the Bank's fi-
nancial health. The second decision would be an independent, informed
business judgment, which may or may not have resulted in net financial
harm to the company. These decisions would be entitled to the protection of
the business judgment rule. The third decision would be tainted for lack of
independence. The board would have rubber-stamped a government order.
However, the resulting decision would not be automatically void. Section
144(a)(3) of the DGCL shields a transaction or contract from voidability if
it "is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or
ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.""2 5
Where there is a loyalty problem, the presumption of the business judgment
rule does not apply and the transaction is actively scrutinized for fairness." 6
The fairness inquiry would fail for lack of an injury.2"7 The board's de-
cision to close the deal was proper for the simple reason that there was no
choice. Intentional or not, Lewis and the board incorrectly asserted the le-
gality of invoking the MAC. Terminating or renegotiating the deal would
have led to the losing side of a lawsuit. Such action would have damaged
the financial market with adverse consequences on both firms.2"' The board
would have run the risk of alienating the government and diminishing the
213 id.
214 Lewis represented to the board that he told federal regulators that the Bank would invoke the
MAC and seek to renegotiate the transaction with Merrill. Board Minutes of Dec. 22, 2008, supra note
60, at 2.
215 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2009).
216 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("[W]here [directors] stand[] on
both sides of a transaction, [they have] the burden of establishing its entire fairness ....").
217 See Dalton v. Am. Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 574, 585 (Del. Ch. 1985) (ruling against plaintiff on the
ground that the alleged breach of fiduciary duty did not cause the challenged transaction giving rise to
the plaintiff's injury).
218 See supra notes 100, 109 and accompanying text.
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company's ability to access financial aid, at least with the current board and
management still in place. Whether or not the board was unduly influenced,
its decision turned out to be fair and advanced the best interests of the com-
pany. This could be the unusual case in which the board took the correct
action because it was disloyal. A plausible motive for attempting to invoke
a weak case for the MAC was a desire to remedy a poorly executed and
negotiated merger by renegotiating the merger consideration. This ill-
advised legal strategy to fix a prior wrong could have produced an even
worse outcome for the company. The government, acting in the best interest
of the public welfare, forced the correct board action, an outcome possible
only when the interests of the public and the corporation are aligned and a
risky possibility of increasing the shareholders' pecuniary stake potentially
conflicts with these interests.
What do we conclude from this case study? Legally, liability under
Delaware corporate law is unlikely because of exculpation for any duty of
care violations, and because there simply was no injury to shareholders
under an assumption that their vote for the merger was not tainted by faulty
disclosure. More broadly, the case study reveals that there is a real possibil-
ity, though unlikely given the available facts, that shareholders "took a bul-
let" in terms of assuming large short-term losses to avoid the injection of
more systemic risk into a crippled financial system, and that the company's
management and board, prompted by government entreaties, were moti-
vated at least in part to advance the public's interest in stabilizing a finan-
cial crisis over the shareholders' immediate pecuniary interest. This recital
of the facts, currently known as of the writing of this Article, is important to
show the contextual color of the regulatory and corporate decision making.
This case study reveals an important aspect of corporate governance that
thus far has not had an opportunity to be analyzed: that is, corporate gov-
ernance is not always a purely private affair, but instead can involve a pub-
lic-private coordinated decision in times of national crisis or systemic risk.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY ISSUES
A. Statutory Authority to Promote Public Welfare
The case study in Part I shows that the Bank had no choice but to as-
sume the heavy financial loss accumulating by Merrill under the terms of
the merger agreement. In this second topical section, presented in Parts II
through IV, this Article discusses the theoretical issues raised by the role of
corporations in public crises. To contextualize the problem, I assume that
the Bank could have terminated the deal on the basis of a legally viable
material adverse change. Under this counterfactual, the Bank would have
been uniquely situated to rescue the financial market by foregoing its legal
option to avoid Merrill's losses. This episode shows the real possibility that
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a board may someday confront the Hobson's choice between maximizing
shareholder wealth and protecting the public welfare or wealth. I consider
in this second topical section the theoretical dimensions of this counterfac-
tual and provide a framework for analyzing fiduciary obligations.
The counterfactual scenario has a predicate: would the Bank have fi-
nancially gained if it had exercised a legal right to terminate the merger?
This is impossible to answer. We will never know what would have hap-
pened, counterfactuals being what they are. Simply put, the answer requires
an informed business judgment during great market uncertainty. Lewis,
Bernanke, and Paulson agreed that the Bank would not have been immune
from the market fallout of Merrill's collapse." 9 There would have been in-
direct, immeasurable harm from further market turmoil if the Bank cut
Merrill loose, and this cost must be weighed against the more direct, meas-
urable, and enormous financial harm from mooring Merrill's liabilities to
the Bank's balance sheet. Even with a sound legal right to terminate the
deal and without a government threat overhanging its decision, the Bank
may have been better off by not invoking the MAC. An informed board
decision made in good faith would have been protected by the business
judgment rule even if the outcome is ultimately terrible.
Importantly, standard corporate law rules may suffice to deal with ex-
traordinary circumstances. Courts could invoke the elision that a board's
decision to assume an enormous financial loss may have some abstract
"long-term" benefit,22° a Potemkin explanation routinely invoked to shield
business judgment from active scrutiny of the merits of ill-advised, stupid,
or erroneous decisions in furtherance of legitimate jurisprudential rea-
sons.22' A board's decision to assume enormous financial loss by voluntar-
219 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
220 See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (111. App. Ct. 1968) (noting that decisions
that may be harmful to current shareholders may be in the "long run interest[s]" of the firm); Paramount
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-55 (Del. 1989) (allowing directors discretion to
choose "long-term" strategy); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("It is the obliga-
tion of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation's
stockholders."). Scholars also distinguish between "short-term" and "long-term" shareholder interest.
See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189,
1198 (2002) (distinguishing between "short run" and "long run" interest of shareholders); Henry Hans-
mann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001)
("There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to
increase long-term shareholder value.").
221 Cf In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[W]hether
a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees
of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational', provides no ground for director liabil-
ity, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a good
faith effort to advance corporate interests."); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1053
(Del. Ch. 1996) ("[Tjhat plaintiff regards the decision as unwise, foolish, or even stupid in the circum-
stances is not legally significant; indeed that others may look back on it and agree that it was stupid is
legally unimportant, in my opinion."). See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND
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ily rescuing another firm may be valid on the ground that the long-term
interest of a stable financial market is in the best interest of the corporation
and shareholders as well,222 similar to the way that the quality of the neigh-
borhood surrounding Wrigley Field was supposedly an important factor in
the baseball team's decision not to install lights in Shlensky v. Wrigley.223
Much of the legitimacy of corporate law, which gives managers great
authority over corporate assets, depends on plausible good faith. These eli-
sions are the white lies of corporate law, not malicious or mendacious, but
perhaps necessary to maintain a proper decorum of law and policy.224 As
long as a board does not explicitly admit that its motive was purely for the
public welfare, as Henry Ford did to his legal detriment in Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co.,225 courts would most likely accept the proffered explanation,
however abstract or undeveloped it may be, and avoid a judicial decision on
the merit of the board's decision.226 During the Merrill acquisition, Lewis
repeatedly asserted that the Bank's interest was intertwined with the public
interest in a sound, stable financial market.227 This assertion anticipates a
ECONOMICS 414 (2002) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW] (explaining that elision of
"long-term interest" of the corporation and shareholders is an excuse by courts to abstain from judg-
ments on the substantive merits of the board's decision); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judg-
ment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83 (2004) (arguing that the business judgment rule
is a doctrine designed to preclude substantive review of the board's decision).
222 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
223 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (111. App. Ct. 1968) ("[T]he effect on the surrounding neighborhood might
well be considered by a director who was considering the patrons who would or would not attend the
games if the park were in a poor neighborhood. Furthermore, the long run interest of the corporation in
its property value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood from deteriorat-
ing.").
224 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 7 ("Efficiency will remain a controversial judicial stan-
dard, in part because determining what counts as a 'cost' and what counts as a 'benefit' in a world of
incomplete markets, strategic behavior, and informational asymmetry inevitably involves guesswork. In
corporate matters, therefore, courts are disinclined to acknowledge the policy rationale for their deci-
sions, even though this rationale is decisive to our normative evaluation of the results courts reach."). It
is notable that one of the three authors of this passage is former Delaware Chancellor William Allen.
Previously, Chancellor Allen argued:
There is a utility in this long-term/short-term device. Though employment of this distinction
is subject to obvious manipulation, it can nevertheless resolve the tension between these dif-
fering conceptions of the corporation in a way that offers the possibility of some judicial pro-
tection to shareholders, while affording substantial room to the multi-constituency, social en-
tity conception to operate.
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZo L. REV.
261,273 (1992).
225 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). Ford testified that "the Ford Motor Company has made too much
money, has had too large profits, and that, although large profits might be still earned, a sharing of them
with the public, by reducing the price of the output of the company, ought to be undertaken." Id. at 683-
84.
226 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 295 ("Thus, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is unique precisely
because Mr. Ford announced that he was acting in the interests of nonshareholders.").
227 See Lewis Congressional Testimony Part I, supra note 86.
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legal defense, but it is undoubtedly true for a systemically-important bank.
Absent particular facts to the contrary and with the incantation of "long-
term interest of the corporation and shareholders," the threat of liability is
whisked away by the spirit of plausible good faith. Alternatively, the court
could actively scrutinize the decision only to find in the end that the empiri-
cal merit of the assertion cannot be tested and thus would give dispositive
weight to the plausibility of good faith in the proffered explanation.22 The
point is this: the current framework for determining liability would allow a
board to provide enormous economic resources during a public crisis. So
long as the board's decision is informed and in good faith, and the explana-
tion suggests some nexus to a corporate benefit however abstract or unfor-
mulated it may be, the probability ofjudicial scrutiny is minimized.229
If so, why is the problem of the Hobson's choice relevant at all? It is
relevant for instrumental, jurisprudential, and practical reasons. Instrumen-
tally, a board cannot be assured that the provision of aid to the public would
fall under a duty of care and business judgment rule rubric, but instead
could be characterized as a duty of loyalty and bad faith issue under which
the directors are accused of intentionally harming the corporation if the
amount of the aid is considered wasteful. A court may plausibly find that a
board acted solely for the benefit of the public welfare (the situation in
Dodge v. Ford) and possibly impose liability for bad faith.' A violation of
the duty of loyalty and bad faith conduct are not subject to exculpation un-
der section 102(b)(7), and thus expose directors to the potential for real
liability.23 ' Jurisprudentially, the recognition of a specific framework for
assessing the Hobson's choice would reveal broader policies and assump-
tions underlying corporate law. A rule of fiduciary safe harbor, for example,
would suggest that the economic returns of the factors of production can be
subjugated in limited circumstances as an aspirational guidance. Norms
228 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney Chancery), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch.
2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). This litigation concerned the severance payment of$130 million
paid to Michael Ovitz, who was Disney's president for fourteen months. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriva-
tive Litig. (Disney Appeal), 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006). The plaintiffs argued that this payment consti-
tuted a breach of fiduciary duty. Disney Chancery, 907 A.2d at 697. The trial lasted thirty-seven days,
and generated 9,360 pages of transcript and 1,033 exhibits. The chancery court's opinion was 174 pages
long. In the end, the Delaware courts held that there was no violation of fiduciary duty. Disney Appeal,
906 A.2d at 75.
229 The business judgment rule provides protection for profit-sacrificing discretionary decisions.
See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738
(2005); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 279-80 (1998); Jill E.
Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637,
652 (2006) ("The combined effect of the business judgment rule and director exculpation provisions
[under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7)] is to limit most fiduciary duty claims to breaches of the duty
of loyalty, that is, manager self-dealing."); id. at 651 ("[N]o modem court has struck down an opera-
tional decision on the ground that it favors stakeholder interests over shareholder interests.").
230 See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
231 See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del. 2001).
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serve to elicit beneficial behavior when the law cannot mandate such con-
duct.232 Scholars, including former Delaware Chancellor William Allen,
have suggested that the schizophrenic scheme of imposing a duty of care
and then taking away real possibility of liability provides "the pedagogic
function of informing [board members] just what 'doing the right thing'
means under the circumstances." '233 Practically, a real possibility of large
liability for waste or bad faith would introduce significant legal uncertainty,
which may paralyze the decision-making process during a national crisis
precisely when such paralysis could cause great harm. A doctrine of fiduci-
ary safe harbor would insulate boards from legal risk, though they may still
be checked by the intra-corporation political and reputational considera-
tions. The board's calculation would then revolve around determining just
what "the right thing" is under the circumstances.
With these reasons in mind, assume that a board intentionally absorbed
a large financial loss, net of all short-term and long-term, direct and indirect
factors. Ordinarily, deliberate conduct to injure a corporation, because of
either self-interest or bad faith, would obviously violate the duty of loy-
alty.234 But the board took this action to avert public harm during a national
crisis with the understanding that there is a net loss, perhaps a large one, to
the corporation. The board would have intentionally inflicted financial
harm, but would there have been a foul?
Without a conflict of interest, there would be no economic rationale
for a privately-subsidized takeover, that is, an acquisition intentionally
priced in excess of the intrinsic value of the deal achievable through arms-
length bargaining. Such a transaction is per se irrational, and thus made in
bad faith. This raises the question of waste. A board is liable for waste
when it transfers assets for no corporate purpose or consideration.235 Waste
is a difficult standard to satisfy. It is limited to unconscionable cases where
directors irrationally squander or donate corporate assets.236 Ordinarily,
courts will not engage in a substantive analysis of the deal: "Courts do not
measure, weigh or quantify directors' judgments. We do not even decide if
232 ALLEN FT AL., supra note 143, at 255.
233 Id. at 257. Absent a loyalty problem, a board is protected at various levels through the business
judgment rule, section 102(b)(7) exculpation, and directors and officers ("D&O") insurance. Id. at 256-
57. Legal liability for a breach of the duty of care is quite rare. Id. at 258-59.
234 See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) ("[W]here
the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties .... " (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del.
2006))). See also In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)
("[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists-will establish the lack of good
faith that is a necessary condition to liability.").
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they are reasonable in this context." '237 The outer boundary of the waste in-
quiry is irrationality.238
If directors honestly professed a desire to subsidize a transaction for
the private benefit of target shareholders, the board would not be entitled to
the business judgment rule because the decision would not have been in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best in-
terest of the company. The entire transaction would be subject to the fair-
ness standard, and it would fail this standard if the price was in fact subsi-
dized with no legitimate business purpose such that there is an actual injury.
Thus, there must be a source of authority allowing a board to specifically
provide corporate assets to third parties. That source is section 122 of the
DGCL, which grants the corporation, acting through the board, specific
powers to execute transactions that are not in the best financial interest of
the corporation or shareholders. 239 Two provisions may apply in a situation
where the company makes a substantial financial sacrifice for the benefit of
the public welfare.
Section 122(9) provides that a corporation has the power to "make do-
nations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational
purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof.
2140
Because a gift is not attached to consideration, it financially harms the cor-
poration. 241 A donation is a gift,24 2 and a gift is the act of "voluntarily trans-
fer[ring] property to another without compensation." '43 An acquirer-
subsidized takeover can be considered a donation to the target to the extent
of the subsidization.2 4 True, this is not the ordinary type of corporate gift,
but the uniqueness of the circumstance does not make inapposite this provi-
237 Id. at 264.
238 Id.
239 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(9) (2009) (allowing a corporation to make "donations for the
public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other national
emergency in aid thereof").
240 Id. See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.02(13) (2003) (corporation has the power "to make
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes"); id. § 3.02(15)
(corporation has the power "to make payments or donations, or do any other act, not inconsistent with
law, that furthers the business and affairs of the corporation").
241 Gifts cannot be justified on the basis that the corporation benefits indirectly. For instance, the
New York statute makes explicit that gifts can be made "irrespective of corporate benefit." N.Y Bus.
CORP. LAW § 202(12) (McKinney 2009).
242 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 561 (9th ed. 2009).
243 Id. at 757.
244 Cf I.R.C. § 2512(b) (2000) ("Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded
the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the amount of
gifts made during the calendar year."); Hooker v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 174 F.2d 863, 865 (5th
Cir. 1949) ("'Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth' the value in excess of such consideration 'shall ... be deemed a gift."' (quoting I.R.C.
§ 1002 (repealed 1954))).
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sion. There is no restriction that a donation must be made to any particular
person or types of persons, but instead it must be made for some public
good.245 Thus, section 122(9) embodies the view that corporate gifts can
substantially affect the national interest.
The observation of the New Jersey Supreme Court in A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,246 which has been cited by Delaware courts,
is apposite:
During the first world war corporations loaned their personnel and contributed substan-
tial corporate funds in order to insure survival; during the depression of the '30s they made
contributions to alleviate the desperate hardships of the millions of unemployed; and during
the second world war they again contributed to insure survival. They now recognize that we
are faced with other, though nonetheless vicious, threats from abroad which must be with-
stood without impairing the vigor of our democratic institutions at home and that otherwise
victory will be pyrrhic indeed.... It seems to us that just as the conditions prevailing when
corporations were originally created required that they serve public as well as private inter-
ests, modem conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well
as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which they operate. Within
this broad concept there is no difficulty in sustaining, as incidental to their proper objects and
in aid of the public welfare, the power of corporations to contribute corporate funds within
reasonable limits in support of academic institutions. 247
Note the references to World War I, the Great Depression, World War II,
and the cold war, as well as the way the court linked corporate philanthropy
to national crisis and public welfare.
Benefits to private actors and the public welfare are not mutually ex-
clusive. In the situation of a national emergency, a subsidized takeover
benefitting a private target may have a substantial public rationale. This is
the precise situation presented in the Bank's acquisition of Merrill. The
financial crisis of 2008 was unquestionably a "national emergency" of the
highest order, and closing the Merrill acquisition was in the public inter-
est.248 Without a corporate gift or contribution, taxpayers either through
TARP or some other measure may have had to pay for a rescue, or the pub-
lic may have had to bear the cost of the collapse of Merrill on the heel of
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. At the same time, financial institutions were
receiving unprecedented financial aid from the government in an effort to
protect private wealth and public welfare. While public funds can be used
to prevent such harm, private resources can also be used when a firm is
uniquely situated to provide a rescue. The assumption of portfolio diversifi-
245 See Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1956) ("[C]orporate gifts may be made
solely for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes .... ").
246 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (holding that a corporate donation to Princeton University was within a
company's corporate power).
247 Id. at 586. See also Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 74 (Del. Ch. 1969) (citing Barlow and noting
the similarity between corporate gift law in New Jersey law and Delaware), afd, 266 A.2d 878 (Del.
1970).
248 See supra Part I.B.
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cation results in the spreading of resources across a broad spectrum of
shareholders, 49 who through their investments have been participants in the
market activities and directly benefit from a rescue. Distributing private
assets to offset some of the burdens on the greater society is a reason for
allowing corporate gifts. As the Barlow court reasoned, "our State has not
only joined with other states in advancing the national interest but has also
specially furthered the interests of its own people who must bear the bur-
dens of taxation resulting from increased state and federal aid upon default
in voluntary giving. '  The subsidized acquisition of Merrill would have
been a private contribution from the Bank toward the government-led effort
to rescue a systemically-important investment bank and to support a col-
lapsing financial market.2"'
Section 122(9) is not an unrestricted license to the Board, which is
bound by fiduciary obligations. Delaware courts recognize a waste limita-
tion subject to a test of reasonableness.252 A subsidized takeover constitut-
ing a gift to target shareholders could possibly pass this scrutiny.253 Impor-
tantly, the gift's absolute size is not dispositive 54 Other relevant factors are
the size of the gift relative to the company's financials, 55 and the extent to
which the community or public would benefit.256 A multi-billion dollar gift
would be a stunning sum if viewed in isolation. Yet, we should not be so
astonished by a billion dollar donation. In this era of large numbers, a bil-
lion seems to be yesterday's million.257 The scale of numbers can be put in
perspective by comparing it to the state of executive compensation, which
can lead to hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in compensation to
249 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 41 (1991) (assuming diversified shareholders in reasoning the rationality of a lack of
shareholder monitoring).
250 Barlow, 98 A.2d at 589.
251 1 say "would" because the transaction was not subsidized. The Bank did not have a legal option
to terminate and thus there was no subsidization after the execution of the merger agreement. See supra
Part I.A.
252 Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 51, 61 (Del. 1991); Kelly, 254 A.2d at 64.
253 1 do not comment on whether the portion of the consideration in excess of fair value should be
taxed as a gift. See I.R.C. § 2512(b) (2000). The Intemal Revenue Code facilities corporate gifts by
providing a deduction. See id. § 170(b)(2)(A) (allowing deductions equal to 10 percent of taxable in-
come). The tax code also provides a helpful guide in determining the reasonableness of a gift. See
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (finding the limitation on
corporate deductions for charitable contributions based on a percentage of total income provides a
"helpful guide" for determining what constitutes a reasonably sized gift).
254 Kelly, 254 A.2d at 74.
255 Kahn, 594 A.2d at 61. In Kahn, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a settlement in which the
corporation would provide, among other things, $50 million toward the construction of a museum,
where its prior year's pretax earnings were $574 million. Id. at 5I, 54.
256 Kelly, 254 A.2d at 74.
257 See id. ("Annually the [gift] payments approximate $5,000,000, and that is an enormous sum by
almost any test.").
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executives,"' and yet Delaware courts have upheld these enormous payouts
as legal.259 By suggesting that gifts can reach the range of billions of dollars,
I do not mean to be cavalier with enormous sums of money. Rather, the
separation of ownership and control, which is an essential feature of the
modem corporation,"' allows managers great discretion to control corpo-
rate assets without a specific, unqualified legal duty to maximize financial
gain or profit.261 It would be dissonant, to say the least, if the structure of
corporate law would allow managers to transfer enormous assets to them-
selves in compensation,262 but not for an exigent social need for the many,
including the corporate enterprise itself, which always derives an indirect
benefit from a stable economy and society. The size of the gift should bear
a relationship to the severity of the crisis.263
In addition to the gift provision, section 122(12) empowers a corpora-
tion to "transact any lawful business which the corporation's board of direc-
tors shall find to be in aid of governmental authority. ' 264 Whereas the gift
provision focuses on the public welfare, this section focuses on government
policy. Surprisingly, while there has been much scholarship on corporate
philanthropy, 265 no Delaware court has cited or analyzed section 122(12)
258 For instance, consider the compensation at Goldman Sachs. In fiscal year ended November
2008, Goldman Sachs generated net revenue (revenue net of interest expense) of $22.2 billion, paid
employee compensation of $10.9 billion, and earned net income of $2.3 billion. Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 76 (Jan. 27, 2009). This means that employees took 49 percent of
net revenue, and shareholders took 10 percent. At the time, it employed 30,067 workers, from janitorial
and secretarial staff to bankers and traders to the CEO. Id. at 15. The average employee earned ap-
proximately $363,000 in compensation.
259 See, e.g., supra note 228 (describing the Disney litigation). The problem of executive compen-
sation has been well documented. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006).
260 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (reprint 1982) (1932).
261 See Elhauge, supra note 229, at 776-77 (explaining managerial discretion from the perspective
of agency cost).
262 See supra note 228 (discussing the Disney litigation, which concerned a $130 million severance
payment made to Michael Ovitz); see also infra note 366 (noting that the former Bear Steams CEO once
held stock valued at approximately $1 billion).
263 For example, private donations for the victims of the September 11 attacks were $2.7 billion.
Private donations following the 2005 South Asia tsunami overtook government aid. Robert J. Rhee,
Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/l I Economy: The Convergence of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Govern-
ment Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 462 n.129 (2005).
264 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(12) (2009); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(14) (2003)
(containing a similar provision: "to transact any lawful business that will aid governmental policy").
Other states have similar provisions. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5502(a)(12) (2009); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-1.2-302(14) (2009); 18 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1016 (12) (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-6102(12) (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:41(B)(13) (2009).
265 BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 221, at 436 n.7.
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216and scholarly attention has been scant, presumably because the circum-
stance required to invoke this power would be most unusual.
The first observation about this provision is its broad grant of author-
ity. Unlike the gift provision, which refers only to power to "make dona-
tions, section 122(12) grants authority to "transact any lawful busi-
ness." '268 The term "lawful business" is the statutory limitation on the scope
of authority, and it refers to laws outside of corporate law that may limit,
prohibit, or criminalize the contemplated corporate activity. Within this
limit, the board has the power to transact "in aid of governmental author-
ity." The plain meaning of "aid" is "help given[;] tangible means of assis-
tance (as money or supplies). ' 269 The historical definition is a "subsidy or
tax granted to the king for an extraordinary purpose" as well as a "benevo-
lence or tribute (i.e., a sum of money) granted by the tenant to his lord in
times of difficulty and distress. '27" This etymology is meaningful in the
context of the DGCL. Under section 122(12), a corporation would have the
specific and broad power to make a corporate acquisition for the purpose of
aiding governmental authority during a global financial meltdown.
An expansive view of board authority flowing from the statute is also
supported by the statutory history. Up until 1969, section 122(12) read: "In
time of war or other national emergency, [corporations are permitted] to do
any lawful business in aid thereof, notwithstanding the business or purposes
set forth in its certificate of incorporation, at the request or direction of any
apparently authorized governmental authority . ".. 271 Several changes are
apparent. The board is no longer restricted to a "request or direction" by
government, but can instead volunteer aid.272 The new section 122(12) does
not restrict aid only to be given in "time of war or other national emer-
266 An initial search shows that only three law review articles have mentioned this provision in
passing. David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 n.45
(1979); Comment, Herald Co. v. Seawell: A New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
1157, 1162 n.30 (1973); Note, Liberalizing SEC Rule 14a-8 Through the Use ofAdvisory Proposals, 80
YALE L.J. 845, 854 n.43 (1971).
267 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(9) (2009).
268 Id. § 122(12) (emphasis added).
269 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 66 (9th ed. 1985).
270 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 80-81 (9th ed. 2009). See also WEBSTER'S, supra note 269, at 66
("[A] subsidy granted to the king by the English parliament until the 18th century for an extraordinary
purpose.").
271 2 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, BALOTrI & FINKELSTEIN'S DELAWARE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 122 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing 1967 version of
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(12)). Interestingly, the 1967 version of section 122(12) is the current New
York formulation: "In time of war or other national emergency, a corporation may do any lawful busi-
ness in aid thereof, notwithstanding the purpose or purposes set forth in its certificate of incorporation,
at the request or direction of any competent governmental authority." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 20 1(c)
(McKinney 2006).
272 See 2 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 271, at § 122.
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gency. '2 73 It also eliminated "notwithstanding the business or purposes set
forth in its certificate of incorporation. 2 74 This mitigates the apparent con-
flict between the corporate charter and corporate statutory law, though there
would still be a tension if the corporate charter in fact contained a prohibi-
tion against such activity.2 75 The 1969 revision of section 122(12) grants the
board "full discretion to authorize any lawful business in aid of governmen-
tal authority. 276
The Bank-Merrill episode shows the potential utility of section
122(12). A strong argument can be made that even if the Bank's board had
the option to terminate the transaction, it should not be held liable choosing
to assume the $15 billion loss, as long as the board did so to aid government
and rescue the public welfare. Moreover, the statute has application beyond
the financial crisis. Crises are a part of the human condition.277 Consider the
following hypothetical. There is a full-blown global flu pandemic, 278 and a
pharmaceutical company has the only vaccine for this particular mutation of
the flu virus. In the past year, the company had $5 billion in net income. In
light of a global pandemic, the board decides to sell the vaccine at cost to
wealthy countries and give it away to poorer countries. The cost to the
company is $1 billion in direct cost and $4 billion in lost profit opportunity.
Can the board come to the aid of government and society? While this hypo-
thetical seems melodramatic, we must remember that the economy and the
financial market were teetering on the verge of collapse in the fall of 2008,
273 See id.
274 See id.
275 One commentator has argued that section 122(12) was amended in response to Medical Com-
mittee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
Note, supra note 266, at 854 n.43. There, the SEC excluded a shareholder proposal recommending that
Dow Chemical not sell napalm unless it could show that it would not be used against human beings.
Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 663. Management suggested that the company sold napalm
not for business reasons (apparently the sales generated little profit and impaired the company's public
image), but because the sale was "morally and politically desirable." Id. at 681. The general cause
exclusion of the shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a-8(c), permits management to omit proposals "sub-
mitted primarily for the purpose of promoting a general social, economic, or political cause." Note,
supra note 266, at 855. The D.C. Circuit suggested that the Rule was not consistent with the congres-
sional purpose. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 680. It suggested that management cannot
use the exclusion "as a shield to isolate such managerial decisions from shareholder control." Id. at 681.
Thus, the commentator argued that section 122(12) was amended to provide management broader power
to aid govemment and to quell challenges of these kind. Note, supra note 266, at 854 n.43.
276 2 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 260, § 122.
277 See Robert J. Rhee, Catastrophic Risk and Governance After Hurricane Katrina: A Postscript
to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/ll Economy, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 582 ("We live in an era of mega-
catastrophes.").
278 Society still lives with the specter of the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which killed about fifty
million people at a time when the global population was 1.8 billion. JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT
INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN HISTORY 396-97 (2004).
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with unthinkable consequences on economies around the world and the
welfare of its citizens.279
B. Fiduciary Exemption, Public Necessity, and the Tort Analogy
Since no court has spoken on section 122(12) or similar provisions
found in other state statutes, we do not know whether the board's authority
is bound by a legal limit.28° The plain text of the statute suggests the bound-
ary, much like the gift provision, is very broad at least. Since the govern-
ment is the primary beneficiary, we may infer that the legislature intended
to grant the board great discretion in providing private aid to a public cause.
Courts would establish the appropriate standard defining the limit. Even if
corporate law is enabled by statute, it is primarily judge-made common law
in Delaware.28 ' Delaware courts could import into section 122(12) a signifi-
cant limit. For instance, they could construe government aid as a form of
philanthropy and impose the same waste standard applicable to section
122(9). Similarly, section 122(15) provides that the corporation has the
power to establish compensation plans for its directors, officers, and em-
ployees, and the board's discretion is not unlimited in this function, at
least in theory (the Disney litigation has shown that the board's discretion is
extremely broad to the point where rationality almost loses meaning). 283 A
limit on authority is sensible and is suggested by the limits placed on other
provisions in section 122.
However, there are countervailing considerations. A legal limit on sec-
tion 122(12) would be problematic. First of all, the waste standard applica-
ble to gifts is inadequate, unless the standard as applied to a crisis is malle-
able. Otherwise, it would be too restrictive under the circumstances because
the provision of assets on par with a corporate gift to a hospital or museum,
for example, may be insufficient. Recall that the Bank assumed Merrill's
$15 billion fourth-quarter loss; this loss may be so breathtaking that it con-
stitutes clear waste fiom the standpoint of an ordinary corporate gift. This
episode also suggests that shareholder ratification is not practically feasible
for it is deeply against self-interest, as well as being a cumbersome mecha-
nism in times when quick action may be needed by managers, who are em-
279 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
280 There are virtually no cases discussing these statutes. The Rhode Island Supreme Court cited its
state statute in issuing an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of another statute. In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO II), 593 A.2d 1356, 1359 (R.I. 1991). But it did not substantively
discuss the statute. See id.
281 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1591 (2005) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism]. Delaware courts
have sometimes ignored the statute or have even judicially rewritten it. Id. at 1594-95.
282 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(15) (2009).
283 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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powered to make these kinds of decisions. One expects that any meaningful
aid during a public crisis may be substantial, thus automatically creating a
potential legal liability for the board if the provision of resources are com-
mensurate with the enormity of the stake involved. There is a potential
Catch-22 absurdity: the exigency of the situation creates a real legal risk
when a board exercises the very authority granted by statute.
The existence of legal risk raises the question of whether a board's
authority should be qualified or absolute. Let us first consider a limiting
principle. If there is to be one, such a principle should be the foundation of
the business judgment rule, specifically an appropriate ex ante procedure
leading to an informed, good faith decision with the limit of rationality as
the outer boundary. During a national crisis, the limit of rationality would
be the point at which the board's decision could be said ex ante to have
financially endangered or impaired the corporation as a going concern.
Corporate endangerment, self-mutilation, or suicide is not an aspirational
end of corporate law.284 The risk of such event occurring is sufficiently
great from the acts of the unfortunate, negligent, or corrupt manager, and
the law need not add to this burden. Therefore, a reasonable limiting princi-
ple may be that the board would be irrational when it takes action knowing
ex ante that its action would impair the corporation's long-term financial
health as a going concern.
Although there is a strong argument for a limiting principle, this Arti-
cle proposes that there should be a fiduciary exemption when a board de-
termines that the firm is uniquely situated to respond to a public crisis, and
it acts under section 122(12) in "aid of governmental authority" or other-
wise provides aid to the public. A fiduciary safe harbor is better because it
removes legal risk from the board's decision involving a public necessity.
The experiences in tort law and public catastrophes have shown that the
paralyzing effect of litigation risk is real during a public crisis and can lead
to very poor outcomes.285 A small probability of liability would not be reas-
suring. Public crises may require consequential decisions with large sums
of resources at stake. A low-probability, high-magnitude liability payout
may still result in a significant expected value of the legal risk. Exposure to
such litigation risk may be sufficiently high to deter potentially beneficial
motive and action. The Bank-Merrill episode provides a useful data point.
As Lewis was resigning himself to the fact that the Bank had to close the
284 Cf Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 J. CORP. L. 143, 149
(2002).
285 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reflection on history is informative:
We find, indeed, a memorable instance of folly recorded in the 3 Vol. of Clarendon's His-
tory, where it is mentioned, that the Lord Mayor of London, in 1666, when that city was on
fire, would not give directions for, or consent to, the pulling down forty wooden houses ...
for fear he should be answerable for a trespass; and in consequence of this conduct half that
great city was burnt.
Respublica v. Sparhawk, I DalI. 357, 363 (Pa. 1788).
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Merrill merger, he was concerned about litigation risk, so much so that he
sought a "comfort letter" from the government to use as part of a legal de-
fense strategy.286 A thought that must have obviously crossed the minds of
the board and legal advisers was the impact on the liability to the board of
the government's coercion and a perceived decision to close the Merrill
deal based on public welfare considerations.
Authority without legal limit, which is another way to view a fiduciary
safe harbor, would be novel. In justifying this rule, I reiterate the basic as-
sumption that the cost-benefit of providing aid during a public crisis would
be clear. A fiduciary exemption could be seen as removing all controls on
management discretion. That is not the case. No legal limit on authority is
not equivalent to no limitation in fact. First of all, the necessity of a public
crisis limits the circumstances in which a board can act under section
122(12) and claim fiduciary exemption. The nature of crises, being what
they are, is fairly indisputable. A private rescue would most likely be coor-
dinated with or at the request of the government,287 though the power to
provide aid under section 122(12) resides with the board. The notion that a
board would gin up the excuse of a public crisis as subterfuge for an illicit
asset transfer to the public, a third party, or the government is unrealistic.
One fear may be that, absent a limit on authority, a board could impair
the corporation as a going concern to promote the public welfare. This fear
is more abstract than real. Self-preservation is a powerful instinct even
when a board is acting as an agent for the legal entity.288 The moral senti-
ment of a good Samaritan is limited by the perceived economic and moral
obligations to the various constituents of the corporation, including share-
holders, creditors, employees, and communities, all of whom benefit from
the firm as a going concern. Board members are also bound by their own
reputational interests, and a good deed at a ruinous cost to the corporation
would not assure a board member's standing among her peers or in the cor-
porate ballot box. Again, the Bank-Merrill episode provides a useful refer-
ence. Upon learning of the losses accumulating at Merrill, Lewis's pro-
fessed instinct was to abort the deal to save the company or his reputation.
If we are to take at face value his view of events, he only changed his mind
upon being persuaded of the consequences of a Merrill collapse by a gov-
ernment with a heavy hand. The instinct for market self-preservation and
personal self-interest are powerful constraints on a desire to provide overly
generous provision of aid to the impairment of the corporate enterprise.
Another fear may be that a board could promote whatever social
agenda it may harbor under the guise of providing aid during a crisis. This
286 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
287 For example, the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management was a private rescue coordinated
by the government. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (recounting the history).
288 See Engledow,supra note 284, at 149.
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is a classic agency cost argument. This fear is also more abstract than real.
First of all, there is already authority to do this; a board can lawfully pro-
vide gifts to promote the public welfare, and this authority is quite broad.
More to the point, just because there is a public crisis, one does not expect
that corporate boards would be indiscriminately using the crisis as an ex-
cuse to provide large resources toward pet projects, unrelated to the crisis
and in amounts that would trigger the threat of litigation. The hypothetical
is far-fetched. For instance, the financial crisis concerned financial institu-
tions and, crisis or not, we do not expect firms unrelated to the crisis to pro-
vide consequential aid. The situational context dictates that for a firm to
consider a rescue at all, it would have to be uniquely situated in relation to
the crisis. We would not expect Pfizer to rescue financial institutions during
a crisis in the financial markets, and likewise we would not expect JPMor-
gan Chase to rescue the public during a global flu pandemic. A direct cau-
sality would connect corporate munificence. The uniqueness of a firm's
situation in relation to the public crisis provides a natural, extra-legal con-
straint on board action.
There is also a pragmatic political reason for fiduciary exemption. The
primary threat to state corporate law is federal intervention.289 What if state
corporate law undermined federal policy by deterring corporate cooperation
with government policy or punishing corporate boards with liability when
the dust settles? To the extent that state law would impose a limitation on a
corporation's ability to aid federal policy during a national crisis, the fed-
eral government may intervene and enact corporate law consistent with the
federal government's regulatory goals (Part IV, infra, discusses this issue in
greater depth).
Based on the above reasons, a rule of fiduciary exemption is more sen-
sible. The rule is simply stated: upon a public necessity, a board of a firm
that is uniquely situated to avert or mitigate a public crisis is exempt from
its ordinary fiduciary duty to the corporation insofar as it distributes corpo-
rate assets with the intent to aid the government or the public.
The theoretical justification for fiduciary exemption can be found in a
well-established doctrine of tort law dealing with public crisis and neces-
sity. As a prefatory matter, I note that corporate law borrows much of its
concepts of duty and standard of liability from tort law.29 ° The analogy to
289 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 604 (2003). See Griffith, supra
note 121, at 54 & n.222 ("And if the federal government passes legislation or regulations moving corpo-
rate law, in whole or in part, into the federal sphere, the authority of the Delaware judiciary over those
matters is effectively preempted." (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977))).
290 See Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 121, at 1301 ("Thus, claimed breaches of the
duty of care were essentially subjected to traditional tort analysis, i.e., whether the duty was violated,
and if so, whether the violation caused harm to the corporation or the shareholders, and the burden of
proof fell upon the plaintiff."); Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 51 U. PiT'. L. REV. 945, 945 (1990) ("The duty of care of corporate directors and officers is a
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tort law is a natural one. Tort law concerns legal wrongs as primarily de-
termined through case-by-case adjudication, and this common law process
defines the parameters of the standards of conduct constituting one's obli-
gation not to harm others. The most obvious application of tort law princi-
ples is a director's duty of care, which is defined in terms of a cause of ac-
tion for negligence. 29' Of course, the analogy is imperfect. The exceptional
aspect of corporate law is that for policy reasons directors are protected
through various devices such as the business judgment rule and exculpation
under section 102(b)(7) for monetary damages. 92 But these devices are
corporate law's overlay on top of the fundamental principles of duty and
fault.
The tort analogy does not stop at the concept of negligence. The duty
of loyalty resembles concepts in tort law. Classic conflict of interest trans-
actions and expropriation of assets find their doctrinal roots, in part at least,
in the civil wrongs of conversion and fraud. Tort law recognizes special
causes of action such as insurance bad faith,293 and more generally it pro-
vides a framework for assessing liability based on a level of scienter falling
below some hostile purpose or motive. For instance, it defines "intent" in
intentional torts to include substantial certainty of the outcome though the
actor may not have desired the outcome.294 Below this level of scienter is
recklessness, which is defined as when an actor knows or has reason to
know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act or
intentional omission not only creates an unreasonable risk of harm, but also
that such risk is substantially greater than that which is needed to meet the
special case of the duty of care imposed throughout the law under the general heading of negligence.");
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 93 (analogizing the fiduciary principle to tort law).
291 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 240.
292 See id. at 253-55 (noting differences between the standards of liability under the corporate and
tort doctrines due to the business judgment rule); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 221, at
286-87; Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259,
270 (1967); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 93. See also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at
256-60 (discussing the business judgment rule and section 102(b)(7) exculpation). Liability insurance is
available to tortfeasors, and directors and officers can be protected by D&O insurance.
293 See, e.g., Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 27-28 (N.Y. 1993) (holding
that the tort of insurance bad faith arises when the insurer has a "gross disregard" for the insured's
interest); Walter v. Simmons, 818 P.2d 214, 221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an insurer is liable
for bad faith "when the insurer's conduct is 'consciously unreasonable' (quoting Trus Joist Corp. v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 735 P.2d 125, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986))). Other areas of the law have incorporated the
concept of good faith. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good
Faith, Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955 (1995).
294 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (defining substantial certainty of outcome as
intent). See also id. § 13 cmt. c ("It is immaterial that the actor is not inspired by any personal hostility
to the other, or a desire to injure him.").
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negligence standard.295 These gradients of culpability are analogous to those
applied in corporate law. For instance, under Delaware law, bad faith con-
duct by the board resulting in harm to the corporation is a subset of a viola-
tion of the duty of loyalty. 96 A director can be found liable for failure to
monitor "[i]f he has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrust-
worthy employee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as
a director, or has ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious
danger signs of employee wrongdoing. 297 Consider the Caremark formula-
tion of liability based on "sustained or systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight," '298 which implies deliberate disregard of substantial risk
of a bad outcome. The formulation for bad faith in Disney is "intentional
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities," '99
which is a particularized standard of reckless behavior. These statements of
culpability are derivative of tort standards, though they are embellished
with a corporate law twist, meaning that residual ambiguity in the standard
leaves much interpretive discretion to courts. 00
The influence of tort law is seen even in the realm of takeover law. It
is apparent that the law of self-defense informs Delaware's standard for
reviewing the appropriateness of a board's adoption of antitakeover de-
fenses. Under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum,30 1 the target has the burden
to establish that the board reasonably perceived that the hostile takeover bid
was a threat to the corporation, and the takeover defensive measure adopted
was reasonable in response to the threat. 3 2 This standard is analogous to the
tort standard, which provides that self-defense measures cannot be "in ex-
cess of that which the actor correctly or reasonably believes to be necessary
295 Id. § 500 (1965). See also W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
212-13 (5th ed. 1984) (defining "reckless" as the unreasonable disregard of a known or obvious risk so
great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow).
296 Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). See also Claire
A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1769, 1778 (2007).
297 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
298 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
299 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
300 The line separating "gross negligence" and "reckless" and "abdication" and "intentional derelic-
tion" and "systematic failure" may not be clearly visible to even Delaware jurists.
It is clear from reading Graham [v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.] and Aronson [v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984),] together that "concepts of gross negligence" would in-
clude behavior which is "reckless" or "cavalier"-words used by the Graham Court. Al-
though gross negligence can theoretically exist where the proof shows behavior that is less
culpable than "reckless" or "abdication," the use of those adjectives, while inconsistent with
ordinary negligence, may not have been intended to carve out a Delaware standard less ex-
acting than gross negligence in the oversight context.
E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans
Union Case, and the ALl Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1503 (1985).
301 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
302 Id. at 954-55.
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for his protection. 3 3 In both circumstances of self-defense, there must be a
reasonable perception of a threat met with a response that must be commen-
surate with the threat level.
It is fair to suggest that tort law informs the liability scheme of corpo-
rate law as the two bodies of law fundamentally concern wrongful conduct
and liability therefrom, though obviously applications and policies may
differ, perhaps substantially so, in the details. If tort law is a reference
point, if not the pole star, for the liability framework of corporate law, it
may prove useful in analyzing a board's liability for financial harm arising
from a private sacrifice of corporate profit or assets. Specifically, the tort
doctrine of public necessity provides a theoretical justification for fiduciary
exemption.
In tort law, the defense of necessity is treated differently depending on
whether the necessity is a private or public need. Private necessity is a de-
fense to an intentional tort against property,3"4 but this privilege is incom-
plete. Under the rule set forth in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.,3
0 5
the defendant must still provide compensation for any harm done.3 °6 A
sailor has a privilege to moor his boat on another person's dock during a
sudden storm,3"7 but must pay for damage done. On the other hand, public
necessity creates a complete defense. The Restatement provides this formu-
lation: "One is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a
trespass to a chattel or a conversion if the act is or is reasonably believed to
be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public disaster."3 8 A public ne-
cessity is a situation when there is a broader threat to the public wealth or
welfare. The common law has long recognized this defense, which dates
back as far as 1609 to Mouse's Case,3"9 and it states that an actor who harms
the property of another in response to a public emergency is not liable to the
property owner.3"' Although this defense is generally invoked by a public
303 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 70(1) (1965).
304 See Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 317 (Ct. App. 1983) (privilege to use tavern
phone to aid the victim of a crime); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (privilege to use another
person's dock to moor one's boat during a sudden storm).
305 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
306 Id. at 222.
307 Ploof71 A. at 189.
308 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 (1965). Under this formulation, a person is immune
from liability even if he was wrong about the existence of a public necessity as long as the belief was
reasonable. But see Struve v. Droge, 62 How. Pr. 233 (C.P.N.Y. 1881) (holding that in cases of public
necessity "they were, by the common law, bound, at their peril, to decide correctly as to such necessity,
to protect themselves from liability to make good the loss").
309 (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341, 1343 (K.B.) (holding that "it is lawful for any passenger to cast the
things out of the barge [upon a sudden storm] .. . everyone ought to bear his loss for the safeguard and
life of a man").
310 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 70 (9th ed. 2008).
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official,311 private actors can invoke it so long as the emergency is reasona-
bly believed to endanger the general public." 2
Both private and public necessity defenses are based on efficiency
considerations. The rule of private necessity under Vincent is justified on
the basis that a private actor will not take property of another that costs
more to preserve her property.313 The efficiency consideration of public
necessity is more apparent: the cost-benefit analysis always weighs in favor
of preserving the public welfare or wealth over private property.3"4 This rule
clearly satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.3 5 Nevertheless, the question is:
why not impose the imperfect privilege of Vincent and thus require the de-
livery of actual compensation?3"6 The simple answer is that the cost-benefit
analysis always works in favor of mitigating a public crisis and the risk is
too great from a moment's hesitation by an actor who is in a position to
rescue based on the calculation of the risk of liability.317 And, because the
board does not personally benefit, the analogy to private necessity as to
board liability is flawed.
Of course, the tort analogy is imperfect. Parties in torts are typically
related only by the accident. A corporate board is a fiduciary to the corpora-
tion, and so there is a well-defined ex ante relationship. A fair question is
whether this prior, legally-defined relationship is inalienable, thereby pre-
cluding an exemption. A fiduciary relationship should not be considered
immutable. Fiduciary duty is not an end, but a means to a broader policy.
What is that policy? According to former chancellor and now professor
William Allen, it is "the creation of economic wealth through the facilita-
tion of voluntary, ongoing collective action."3 8 I do not argue that Allen's
formulation is the end of corporate law, but certainly it captures an impor-
tant consideration. Although fiduciary duty promotes the policy of wealth
creation by mandating the board's fidelity to the corporation, fiduciary ex-
emption is consistent with the policy of wealth or welfare maximization
311 See, e.g., Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 72, 74 (1853) (holding that the mayor of San Francisco
was not liable for ordering the destruction of the plaintiffs home).
312 KEETON, supra note 285, at 146-47. See, e.g., Mouse's Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.).
313 The efficiency consideration is seen if one imagines that the actor owns both properties. See
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 158 (1973) ("The Transportation
Company, now the sole-party involved, would, when faced with the storm, apply some form of cost-
benefit analysis in order to decide whether to sacrifice its ship or its dock to the elements."). See also
Bamford v. Tumley, (1860) 122 Eng. Rep. 25, 33 (K.B.) (providing a single owner hypothetical analysis
in determining whether compensation should be provided in nuisance).
314 Respublicav. Sparhawk, I DalI. 357, 362 (Pa. 1788).
315 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (7th ed. 2007).
316 Actual delivery of compensation is not required to satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. See id.
317 Respublica, I DalI. at 362.
318 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 2 ("[T]he modem law of organizational forms-most notably
corporation law-is premised on the idea that facilitating individuals' efforts to create wealth is wise
public policy.").
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through collective action in the limited circumstance of a public crisis. In
the case of a public crisis, the real issue is whether or not priority is given to
wealth distribution to shareholders or the preservation of aggregate societal
wealth or welfare. The board's relationship to the corporation is not solely
defined by an instruction to accumulate wealth for shareholders, which by
creating residual income tends to increase societal wealth and welfare. As-
pects of corporate law refute this narrow view. As we have seen, sections
122(9) and 122(12) grant authority for the distribution of assets to others
without consideration, and a number of states have enacted constituency
statutes that authorize the board to consider various constituencies." 9
With respect to the question of duty, tort law again provides a useful
analogy. In tort doctrine, duty does not exist in a state of nature. Whether a
duty exists is laden with policy considerations, the most famous example of
which is Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.32' The existence of a duty is a
legal question, and courts "fix the duty point by balancing factors, including
the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally . . . and public
policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of liabil-
ity."32' This jurisprudential method is not limited to the realm of torts.
Delaware courts have applied a similar policy-based analysis to shift fiduci-
ary duty to creditors in insolvency (as discussed further in Part II1).322 The
recognition of a limited exemption is the next iteration in the development
of a fiduciary framework based on a broad goal of social wealth or public
welfare maximization arising from voluntary, collective action. A fiduciary
safe harbor may be justified if the underlying policy is sufficiently compel-
ling and consistent with the broader goals of corporate law. Public necessity
and the cost-benefit of a rescue, this Article argues, meet this criterion to
justify a fiduciary safe harbor for a corporate board and thus eliminate legal
risk from the board's consideration when the threat to the public is grave.
III. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IN CRISIS
While the legal issues concerning the Bank board's actions can proba-
bly be resolved in litigation without breaking new ground, the episode and
319 See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice:
Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1827 (2002)
(identifying thirty-one states that have adopted corporate constituency statutes).
320 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). See also William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. I,
15 (1953) ("These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a duty if the court says there is a
duty....").
321 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (N.Y.
2001) (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 2001)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). This case concerns the question of whether a tort duty exists in the context of a
pure economic loss.
322 See infra text accompanying notes 364-71.
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the permutations of counterfactuals expose a recurring, fundamental tension
in corporate law. What is the purpose of the corporation and more generally
business? The answer to this question depends on one's conception of the
firm and view of shareholder primacy.
There are two broadly defined, competing views of the firm. The
"property model" views the corporation as a collective set of contractual
rights to the production of the firm.323 This conception is rooted in an eco-
nomic theory of the firm. Many economists and corporate law scholars,
drawing on the foundational work of Ronald Coase, 324 have argued that
corporate law can be seen "as a standard-form contract, supplying terms
most venturers would have chosen but yielding to explicit terms in all but a
few instances. 32 5 Corporate law is seen fundamentally as a contractual
governance structure, providing a standard set of contractual terms from
which the parties can modify and add.326 On the other hand, the "entity
model" views the corporation as an entity having significance independent
from the property interests of its claimants.327 An independence from the
property claims of capital providers allows the manager to consider more
broadly the interests of other constituents who do not have a formal con-
tractual nexus to the firm.328 Of course, there are nuances to these models,
big and small, but an exploration of the theory of the firm is not the purpose
of this Article. For the purpose here these basic characterizations suffice.
The two competing conceptions of the firm are at the heart of the de-
bate on the purpose of the corporation.329 The property model situates the
firm and corporate law squarely within the realm of private law.33 ° The en-
tity model allows the public interest to regulate the behavior of manager
and corporate activities through corporate law.3 The property model has
strong support from academics, activist investors, and increasingly direc-
tors, while the entity theory of the firm has support from corporate manag-
ers, directors, and less support in the academy. 332 As a matter of positive
theory, however, the entity model is more consistent with the managerial
concept of the corporation, which allows managers leeway to consider non-
shareholder interests: "[It] has, in fact, dominated the real world of business
323 See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1395, 1398-99 (1993) (describing the property and entity models of the firm).
324 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
325 EAsTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 15.
326 Allen, supra note 323, at 1400.
327 Id. at 1402. See also Margaret Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
328 Allen, supra note 323, at 1402.
329 Allen, supra note 224, at 264-66.
330 Id.
331 id.
332 Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 6, at 1075-76.
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and politics since the great depression." '333 According to at least three cur-
rent or former Delaware jurists, Leo Strine, Jack Jacobs, and William Allen,
who have participated in the scholarly debate, Delaware corporate law is
founded on the entity model of the corporation.334
Shareholder primacy is a logical extension of the theory of agency
cost.335 This argument constructs a principal-agent model of the firm, and
the argument goes as follows. The firm is seen as a nexus of contract
claims. 33 6 Creditors and employees negotiate and contract directly with the
managers representing the firm, and thus they can adequately protect their
interests.337 Shareholders do not have the benefit of such explicit contracts
and yet they are the most vulnerable to risk because they hold the residual
claim.338 Corporate agents thus should be obligated to maximize profit.339
But agents who control corporate assets may not do this because they are
also subject to their individual interests in the firm.340 If so, it is said that an
agent held accountable to two or more principals will confront conflicting
interests in serving them and in the end these interests serve to excuse be-
havior that promotes only the agent's interest.34' Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel explain: "Faced with a demand from either group, the man-
ager can appeal to the interests of the other. Agency costs rise and social
wealth falls." '342 Fidelity to the shareholder pecuniary interest may produce
333 Allen, supra note 323, at 1403.
334 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in
Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any "'There" There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1176 (2002)
("[T]he entity model prevails .... "); Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 6, at 1079
("Delaware law inclines towards the entity model."); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 296 ("To whom
do directors owe loyalty? The short answer is that they owe their duty to the corporation as a legal
entity."). See also N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007) (noting that fiduciary duty is to the corporation and that shareholders have standing to bring
derivative action on behalf of the corporation).
335 The shareholder primacy norm means a standard based on an expectation, created by social,
legal, or ethical considerations that corporate agents should act primarily in the best interest of share-
holders, who are assumed to want maximum profit. See Smith, supra note 229, at 278.
336 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 22-25.
337 See id. at 50 (arguing that with respect to limited liability "there is no externality with respect to
voluntary creditors"); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability
of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) ("[Flew question
the shifting of these risks when creditors voluntarily deal with the limited liability enterprise."). See also
Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 788 (Del. Ch. 1987) (holding that fiduciary duty does not inure to the
holders of convertible debt), affd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988).
338 EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 249, at 22-25.
339 Id. at 36-39.
340 Id. at 38.
341 Id. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (advancing a theory of
agency cost).
342 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 38. Others have argued that stakeholder theory is
flawed because an organization must have a single objective. Multiple objectives leave corporate agents
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bad effects. But if a political society wishes to change the net effects of
corporate behavior, it can do so in one of two ways, by changing either the
prices of the activity or the structure of the firm.343 Given this choice, the
shareholder primacy norm requires that society alter economic incentives to
produce the desired effects while leaving intact the wealth-maximizing
principles built into the firm.3 4 4
Any theory of the firm must recognizes the paramount importance of
economic productivity, global competitiveness, and societal wealth.345 So
pervasive are these concerns that "a more realistic and complex conception
of corporations and corporate law could successfully be advanced only if it
were premised on a plausible claim that such a model could lead to more
productive organizations in utilitarian terms."34' The nexus of contracts the-
ory (or property model) brings together the essential observations from the
economic literature: those being (i) that a firm is cost efficient because it
standardizes the contracting process, (ii) that agency cost should be miti-
gated, and (iii) that a firm is a private economic activity and not a social
cause. The theory provides the intellectual framework for the idea that a
firm should be seen not as a public asset or a concession from the state, but
instead as an aggregate of private property rights held by constituents as
specific contractual claims on its cash flow and assets. 47 In the legal acad-
emy, this property conception of the firm has garnered the greatest sup-
port.348 Recently, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have declared
"the end of history for corporate law" as they boldly declared the end of the
debate: "[A]s a consequence of both logic and experience, there is conver-
gence on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of
aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly account-
able to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those inter-
ests." '349
with no method for determining how to choose between them, should they conflict. This, the argument
goes, leads to an increase in agency cost. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 237-38 (2002); Mark J. Roe,
The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2063,
2065 (2001); Stout, supra note 220, at 1199-1200.
343 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 37-38.
344 Id. at 37; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 220, at 441-42.
345 Allen, supra note 323, at 1406.
346 Id.
347 The lack of an internally consistent economic theory for what is essentially an economic activ-
ity diminishes the force of the stakeholder argument. MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM:
GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 2 (2000); Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 220, at 44349.
348 Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 6, at 1075-76.
349 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 220, at 441.
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The debate over shareholder primacy is the "most basic and arguably
most persistent controversy in corporation law."35 However, an important
aspect of this controversy has long been settled: outside of a narrow excep-
tion limited to the takeover realm,35" ' there is not a legally enforceable obli-
gation to maximize shareholder profit. No serious person questions that
firms should seek to earn profit through their activities, and shareholders,
being residual interest holders, most often have the most to gain and risk.
Most would accept as a starting point at least the importance of sharehold-
ers' interests, perhaps a statement something along the lines of "a corpora-
tion.., should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a
view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain." '352 Likewise, it is
undeniable that corporate law, both statutes and court opinions, eschews the
"ruthlessly narrow focus," '353 such as Milton Friedman's famous proclama-
tion that a corporation should "make as much money as possible while con-
firming to the basic rules of the society." '354 There is not a single case or
statute that states something along the lines of "a board has a fiduciary duty
to solely maximize shareholder profit in managing the firm as a going con-
cern." The closest statement of a legal obligation was made in the famous
case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.:" "A business corporation is organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of
the directors are to be employed for that end."'356 But this 1919 decision of
the Michigan Supreme Court, found in most corporate law casebooks, is
350 Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 6, at 1071. See also Berle, supra note 6, at
1049 (corporate agents exercise power "only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their inter-
est appears"); Dodd, supra note 6, at 1148 (the corporation "has a social service as well as a profit-
making function").
351 The most prominent exception is in the takeover context of a cash buyout, under which the
board of directors is under a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder profit. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). See also Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994) (holding that absent the takeover context, directors are not
obligated to maximize shareholder wealth).
352 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1994). The ALl "makes clear that certain kinds of conduct must or may
be pursued ... even if the conduct either yields no economic return or entails a net economic loss." Id.
cmt. f.
353 Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 6, at 1083.
354 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32-33. Delaware has rejected a hard-line view of shareholder pri-
macy. See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) ("[A] board of
directors ... is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value .... "). See also Stout, supra
note 220, at 1204 ("Delaware courts seem to have come down rather firmly on Dodd's side of the Berle-
Dodd debate.").
355 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
356 Id. at 684.
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famous because it is an outlier.357 Under the business judgment rule, direc-
tors who consider stakeholder interest and sacrifice profit, like directors
who dispense with these considerations and instead maximize profit, will be
insulated from liability. 358 The persistent controversy concerns the norm of
shareholder primacy, an unenforceable prescription that the primary pur-
pose of a corporation should be to maximize the shareholders' wealth.359
With this understanding of the theory of the firm and shareholder pri-
macy, the object lesson of the Bank's acquisition of Merrill is that the
shareholder primacy norm can conflict with the broader goal of enhancing
aggregate social welfare or wealth. It is perhaps undeniable that the inter-
ests of the firm, shareholders, and the public are aligned in preserving the
financial markets. If, however, current shareholders could have gained at
the expense of exacerbating a financial catastrophe, a clear net loss in the
cost-benefit analysis, the board was empowered to prevent such catastrophe
by assuming private loss for the greater public gain. As a normative matter,
such expansive authority should be proper, and as a positive matter, such
authority can be found in Delaware corporate law.
This thesis is consistent with the animating principle of corporate
law-that is, corporate law is founded on the principle of social wealth
maximization.36 This principle is not the same as shareholder profit maxi-
mization, which at its essential level is a distributive concern.361 Scholars
have observed that there are numerous anomalies inconsistent with the
principal-agent model, and they hint at the possibility that the prevailing
model of corporate law may need a paradigm shift.362 Shareholder primacy
is a default norm only, and it can be subjugated to the interests of other con-
stituents.363 For instance, many states have constituency statutes that permit
357 See Robert J. Rhee, Corporate Ethics, Agency, and the Theory of the Firm, 3 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 309, 321 (2008) (noting that the case is "a novelty"); Blair & Stout, supra note 327, at 301 (noting
that the case is "highly unusual"); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 298 ("Thus, Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co. is unique precisely because Mr. Ford announced that he was acting in the interests of nonsharehold-
ers.").
358 BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 221, at 414.
359 Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1357-58 (2007) ("Academic commentary typically assumes that there is a legally
enforceable duty to maximize shareholder wealth. In fact, apart from certain very narrow takeover
contexts, judges have refrained from mandating an overarching duty to maximize share prices." (foot-
note omitted)).
360 ALLEN E7 AL., supra note 143, at 2.
361 See id. at 296 (noting that shareholder interests may conflict with the interests of other constitu-
ents). Even strong proponents of shareholder profit maximization do not suggest that profit and social
welfare are perfectly aligned. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 39.
362 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corpo-
rate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719 (2006).
363 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 298 (noting that shareholder primacy "has not fully
eclipsed.., the view that directors must act to advance the interests of all constituencies in the corpora-
tion, not just the shareholders").
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the board to consider the interests of nonshareholder interests.3" We have
also seen two other anomalies: the specific power to provide both gifts and
government aid. Both provisions authorize the board to inflict financial loss
on the corporation through the provision of assets to third-parties without
consideration.
There are other examples of the subordination of shareholder primacy
to a normatively superior principle. A prominent example is the now well-
established doctrine allowing a board to pivot its fiduciary obligation from
shareholders to creditors in insolvency. A board's fiduciary obligation ordi-
narily runs to the corporation and shareholders.365 In the seminal case Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N. V. v. Pathe Communications Corp. ,366 Chan-
cellor Allen articulated an exception: "At least where a corporation is oper-
ating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the
agent of the residu[al] risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enter-
prise." '367 This means that the board has "an obligation to the community of
interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed,
good faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating
capacity." '368 In the vicinity of insolvency, the shareholder interest in the
firm begins to mimic the interest of option holders in the sense that their
value is increased when the riskiness of the firm's cash flow increases,
though such risk-taking diminishes the overall value of the enterprise, that
is, the sum of the equity and credit claims.369 Under these circumstances,
364 See Subramanian, supra note 319, at 1827-28.
365 See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007) ("[D]irectors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit
of its shareholder owners.").
366 No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991), reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099 (Del. Ch.
1991).
367 Id. at *34.
368 Id.
369 In his famous footnote, Chancellor Allen demonstrated this proposition. Id. at *34 n.55. The
hypothetical goes like this. A corporation has a single asset, a judgment of $51 that is currently on
appeal. It has a liability to creditors of $12. The probability on appeal is: 25 percent affirmance, 70
percent modification of judgment to $4, and 5 percent reversal. The expected value of the judgment is
$15.55. The equity value of the firm is $3.55 (= $15.55 - $12). Any settlement above $15.55 will in-
crease the value of the firm. Assume a settlement offer of $17.50 is made. Creditors will want to accept
because it assures payment, and there is even $5.50 left over for shareholders. But shareholders will not
want to settle. They will want to pursue the appeal because it has a higher expected payoff to them.
They have a 25 percent chance of a payoff of $39 (- $51 - $12), which is an expected residual value of
$9.75. This sum is substantially greater than the $5.50 that would be left over from a settlement at
$17.50. The point is that under certain circumstances, shareholders may be incentivized to diminish the
value of the firm (in this case, a rejection of a settlement offer in excess of the enterprise value). This
example shows that when the shareholders' interests is essentially reduced to the option value of equity,
the shareholders have an incentive to increase the riskiness of the firm's anticipated cash flow, even
though such risky decisions may reduce the enterprise value of the firm. See Robert J. Rhee, The Effect
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"the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity" is realized only if
directors "are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and eco-
nomic entity." '37 Subsequently, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the
principle that fiduciary duty can shift to creditors, but modified the trigger
to actual insolvency.371 In so ruling, the court made the commonsensical
observation that "[w]hen a corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors
take the place of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of any in-
crease in value. 372
The doctrine of fiduciary duty to creditors played an important role in
the recent financial crisis. During the negotiation over the acquisition of
Bear Steams, Jimmy Cayne, a Bear Steams board member, threatened to
throw the company into bankruptcy rather than accept a low bid offer from
JPMorgan Chase. 373 This "nuclear card" was a calculated game of
brinksmanship with the federal government, the stakes being either a fed-
eral bailout of Bear Stearns, which would then remain independent, or a
collapse of the firm with potentially worldwide financial fallout.374 Among
other considerations, Cayne recognized that the claim to the primary value
of the firm resided with bondholders, who owned approximately $70 billion
of the firm's debt; recognizing that the coordinated JPMorgan-federal gov-
ernment rescue of Bear Stearns was a bailout of creditors, he attempted to
negotiate some distribution of their value to shareholders.375 The share-
holder tactic of holding hostage the economic interest of the firm as a whole
is not unheard of,3 76 only the stakes here concerned the global financial
of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 193, 201-07 (2007) (discussing the difference between
asset pricing and option pricing).
370 Credit Lyonnais, No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 & n.55 (emphasis added).
371 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007).
372 Id.
373 COHAN, supra note 16, at 91, 103-06. Cayne was a prominent shareholder, former CEO of Bear
Steams, and a Wall Street legend. He was quoted as ruminating out loud: "I knew that there was very
strong probability that if Bear Steams went down, there might be systemic failure .... I knew I had a
nuclear card. But you can't play it.... If anybody on earth would have played it, it would have been
me." Id. at 91 (quoting Cayne) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the time, Cayne owned approxi-
mately six million shares, which at their height had been worth more than $1 billion. Id. At $10 per
share, this value was reduced to approximately $60 million.
174 Id. at91.
371 Id. at 104.
His finger moved back over the red button. He wondered if the firm's bondholders, who to-
gether held $70 billion of debt and who in a merger with JPMorgan would be made whole
but in bankruptcy would be severely impaired, should be asked to make a contribution to the
shrinking pie for shareholders .... As Cayne knew, the bondholders had by far the most to
gain from a deal with JPMorgan.
Id.
376 See, e.g., Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997) ("A board
may certainly deploy corporate power against its own shareholders in some circumstances-the greater
good justifying the action-but when it does, it should be required to demonstrate that it acted both in
good faith and reasonably.").
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market. Ultimately, independent board members persuaded Cayne and Bear
Steams managers that the option was unthinkable.377 Their primary concern
shifted from shareholders to bondholders and other interested constituents
including employees.378 Indeed, during the board meeting to decide whether
to accept JPMorgan Chase's acquisition offer, Bear Steams's legal adviser,
Sullivan & Cromwell, advised the board that under Delaware law its fiduci-
ary duty had shifted to creditors and other interest groups such as employ-
ees.379 Imagine that in the heat of the moment and in a desperate gamble to
increase shareholder wealth, the "nuclear card" was played. What would
have been the consequences on the wealth of the corporate enterprise and
the welfare of the public? The Bear Steams episode vividly demonstrates
Chancellor Allen's rationale in Credit Lyonnais.
Although the concept of fiduciary duty to creditors has been sharply
criticized in scholarly literature,38 there is a well founded, core principle at
work. Shareholder primacy is simply a default rule for social wealth maxi-
mization. Since shareholders hold the residual economic claim to the corpo-
ration's assets, director accountability as measured by shareholder benefit
has the effect of enhancing the entire value of the enterprise as a whole
economic entity. The thought is that shareholder primacy is based on effi-
ciency consideration. However, maximizing shareholder value is not ipso
facto a superior proposition. The proposition fails when the shareholders'
claim is viewed as an out-of-the-money call option.' Intrinsic in the con-
cept of shareholder value is a distributive quality.38 Stated simply, it is
fairly obvious that shareholder wealth can increase in only three distinct
ways: (1) the total size of the wealth created by the enterprise increases,
thus leaving a greater residual claim for the shareholders; (2) the economic
pie remains the same, but shareholders take a greater portion than other
claimants; and (3) shareholders increase their wealth by taking action that
reduces the size of the economic pie, thus diminishing the aggregate returns
to other claimants.383
Only the first proposition increases social wealth and is thus a norma-
tively superior outcome.384 The second proposition is neutral as to social
wealth, and the matter concerns only the equity of distribution. For in-
stance, if we assume that there are no externalities, society should not care
377 COHAN, supra note 16, at 106.
378 Id. at 106-09.
379 Id. at 108-09.
380 See, e.g., Hu & Westbrook, supra note 359, at 1341-43. See also Royce de R. Barondes et al.,
Panel Discussion: Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and Creditors of Troubled Com-
panies, I J. Bus. & TECH. L. 229 (2007).
381 See supra text accompanying note 363.
382 Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1417 (2010).
383 id.
384 See id. at 1440-46 (arguing that limited liability is justified only on the basis of wealth creation
and not cost externalization).
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that employees of Goldman Sachs take approximately 50 percent of net
revenue of the firm and shareholders only 10 percent, such an arrangement
being the private contractual arrangement achieved among the factors of
production.385 In these circumstances, the law generally does not interfere in
the contractual relationships establishing the distribution of the economic
pie. It is said that enterprise law provides a set of default contract terms
among factors of production. Absent fraud or some other bad motive, the
contract terms govern and market forces primarily provide the pricing
mechanism for these commercial relationships, including the market for
corporate control if the shareholder slice is less than it should be.3"6
The third proposition, a situation contemplated in Credit Lyonnais, is a
clearly inferior proposition. The notion that shareholders are made wealthy
by reducing the social wealth cannot be a desired goal. To be sure, this ef-
fect is seen, perhaps frequently, as is the case when limited liability is used
as an ex ante liability avoidance scheme.387 Would any efficient or just soci-
ety provide a shield against liability if it had perfect information and knew
beforehand that a firm would impart social cost for which its assets cannot
pay? Such a society would be economically and morally bankrupt. A rule
promoting a reduction in the aggregate social wealth is inefficient and can
be justified only on the illicit premise that a specific class of capital provid-
ers has an entitlement to their wealth maximization at a larger cost to soci-
ety.
The rule of fiduciary duty to shareholders reflects the view that credi-
tors are adequately protected through contractual agreements, fraud and
fraudulent conveyance law, implied covenants of good faith and fair deal-
ing, bankruptcy law, general commercial law, and other creditor rights.388
On the other hand, shareholders can only be legally protected through statu-
tory corporate law and common law-based fiduciary duty.389 The fair as-
sumption is that this scheme of legal protection for creditors and sharehold-
385 See supra note 258. Of course, society cares greatly about executive compensation because
there are negative externalities arising from perverse incentives, erosion of trust, and inefficient alloca-
tion of corporate resources. The financial crisis is a prime example.
386 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965). But market mechanisms can break down. "Having gained control of the board, top management
may decide that collusion and expropriation of security holder wealth are better than competition among
themselves." Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 293
(1980).
387 See, e.g., Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (taxi enterprise partitioning assets to
avoid liability); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966) (same).
388 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,99 (Del. 2007).
389 Of course, shareholders can also exercise the "Wall Street rule" and sell shares if the corpora-
tion is not providing an adequate return. In this way, there is competition for equity capital that always
keeps the attention of the directors on profitability. See Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters:
Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, II U. PA. J. Bus. L. 631, 670 (2009)
(discussing the "Wall Street rule" as "the classic limit on management's ability to deviate from profit
goals").
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ers tends to increase enterprise value, and thus fiduciary duty to sharehold-
ers is considered a superior default norm. This assumption, however, is only
a default. As the Delaware courts have noted, there are special circum-
stances where shareholder profit maximization can result in the diminished
enterprise value.39 ° The rule of fiduciary duty to creditors addresses the spe-
cial situations where shareholders would maximize their profit only by re-
ducing the enterprise value of the firm.
The common principle binding the two rules of fiduciary duty is social
wealth maximization. The more accurate measure of the value of a firm is
enterprise value, the economic pie available to all capital providers.39" '
Shareholder primacy is highly correlated to the principle of wealth maximi-
zation, and this correlation is the basis for the normative foundation of
shareholder primacy. But the correlation is not perfect, and shareholder
primacy is essentially a distributive principle concerning the return to only
one class of capital providers. To the extent that the shareholder primacy
undermines the normative goal of social wealth enhancement, that norm is
subjugated.392
Another prominent principle of social wealth maximization is the con-
cept of limited liability. Its purpose is not to facilitate liability avoidance
and risk externalization; rather, limited liability is justified because its many
benefits outweigh the cost of risk externalization.393 These benefits are well
known.394 In short, limited liability decreases the cost of monitoring manag-
ers and other shareholders, increases the liquidity of shares, promotes diver-
sification, and incentivizes managers to pursue positive net present value
projects.395 These combined effects increase the value of the firm in several
ways. They reduce agency cost and the cost of capital.396 The cost of equity
is reduced when shares are freely alienable and there is a liquid market.397
The cost of debt is also lowered because limited liability reduces transac-
tion cost of credit by providing a standard default contract term.39 These
390 See supra text accompanying note 366.
391 "[A]n individual is as well off as possible if his or her wealth, measured by the discounted
present value of all future claims, is maximized." Jensen, supra note 342, at 241.
392 See supra text accompanying note 366.
393 Rhee, supra note 382, at 1437-40, 1487.
394 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 41-47 (providing litany of well recognized
justifications). See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW, supra note 221, at 132-51; Paul Halpern,
Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law,
30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 118 (1980) (listing some long-recognized economic benefits of limited liabil-
ity corporations and claiming that, no matter the status of the law, companies practice some form of
limited liability by common consent).
395 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 41-44.
396 See id. at 41-47 (listing ways in which limited liability corporations decrease the need to moni-
tor agents and reduce the cost of monitoring shareholders, and discussing how limited liability corpora-
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cost savings can then be directed toward the economically productive ac-
tivities of the firm.3 9 9 Thus, limited liability is economically efficient and
increases social wealth.
The criterion used to determine corporate law's efficiency is impor-
tant. Efficiency is based on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which is distin-
guished from the Pareto superior efficiency. The Pareto superior criterion
states that a change is efficient if at least one person is made better off and
no person is made worse off.4"' This criterion has few practical applications
because transactions often have third-party effects and the cost of bringing
about compensation may often exceed the net surplus.4"' In contrast, Kal-
dor-Hicks efficiency provides that a change is efficient if gainers gain more
than the losers lose.4°2 The important concept is that in principle the gainers
could compensate the losers and still enjoy a surplus, but compensation is
not required.4 3 "In other words, efficiency corresponds to 'the size of the
pie,' while equity has to do with how it is sliced. 4' This is essentially a
cost-benefit analysis,4 5 which has greater practical application than the Pa-
reto superior criterion. Thus, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency "has become a stan-
dard tool for evaluating enterprise law. 40 6
A cost-benefit analysis is the governing principle of corporate law.407
Society has a normative preference for greater aggregate wealth. 408 The
Kaldor-Hicks criterion provides a simple, compelling animating principle
for the default norm of shareholder primacy, the pivot of fiduciary duty to
creditors, and the rule of limited liability. These rules tend to increase social
wealth: shareholder primacy, because it directs managers to create residual
profit; fiduciary duty to creditors, because shareholders are incentivized to
destroy firm value when their economic claim resembles an out-of-the-
money call option rather than a true residual claim; limited liability, be-
cause it creates value even though it externalizes the cost of torts. Together,
these doctrines constitute a coherent picture that shareholder primacy, like
the business judgment rule, is merely a presumption, albeit a fairly strong
399 See id. at 44 ("The increased availability of funds for projects with positive net values is the real
benefit of limited liability.").
400 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 47 (5th ed. 2008).




404 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (3d ed. 2003).
405 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 400, at 47.
406 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 5.
407 See id. at 3-4.
408 Id. at 2.
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one.4"9 The distributive principle of shareholder primacy is not the end of
corporate law, but is instead a default setting because in most cases profit
maximization nicely correlates to increased social wealth.41 ° The default
setting can change when the social cost-benefit calculus changes. In the
face of clear evidence of the threat of abnormally large social harm associ-
ated with a national crisis, the board can subjugate shareholder primacy,
which even in normal times is an unenforceable norm, to directly advance
the societal interest preventing or mitigating such harm.
The financial crisis of 2008 teaches us that the cost-benefit analysis
does not always weigh in favor of private financial gain. Indeed, much of
its causality can be explained by the pursuit of short-term private gain by
employees, managers, and vicariously passive shareholders of the many
firms responsible for the crisis.411 In ordinary circumstances, the framing of
shareholder primacy is not at issue, and we correctly assume that the profit-
maximizing firm with its embedded distributive principle generally tends to
enhance social wealth and welfare because the legal process is ill-suited to
engage in an individualized assessment of cost-benefit and the distribution
of surplus to the various participants and constituents.4 12 The rising tide of
shareholder wealth lifts all boats; it is correctly assumed as the default aspi-
ration. The incentive structure underlying profit maximization works most
of the time in ordinary circumstances.4 13 This default setting, however,
should not diminish society's greater interest in the protection of the finan-
cial markets and the national economy, or the public good more generally
in times of great crises. These interests can outweigh the narrow financial
interests of any single firm since a sound economy and market are precon-
ditions to the long-term health of a company.
409 See id. at 296 ("When a solvent corporation pursues its regular business activities, the interests
of its management, creditors, employees, and stockholders are largely congruent with the interests of its
equity investors.").
410 The observation of William Allen, Reinier Kraakman, and Guhan Subramanian in their case-
book provides a succinct statement of this concept.
The "corporation" has multiple constituencies with conflicting interests, including stockhold-
ers, creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers. To say that directors owe loyalty to the
corporation masks conflicts among these constituencies. Happily, in most cases, these con-
flicts can be reconciled in practice. When a solvent corporation pursues its regular business
activities, the interests of its management, creditors, employees, and stockholders are largely
congruent with the interests of its equity investors. Thus, it makes no difference whether
managers think of themselves as furthering long-term shareholder interests or furthering a
multiconstituency interest in long-term corporate welfare.
Id.
411 See Rhee, supra note 1I, at 93-94 (explaining that Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill
Lynch became distressed because of poor risk management and short-term focus on profitability).
412 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 296 ("When a solvent corporation pursues its regular business
activities, the interests of its management, creditors, employees, and stockholders are largely congruent
with the interests of its equity investors.").
413 See id.
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The specific set of complex considerations confronted by the Bank's
board had arisen before. Consider the assessment of Jamie Dimon, JPMor-
gan Chase's CEO, regarding the Bear Steams acquisition.
The import of this massive direct intervention to save a securities firm from failing
was historic. Yet there was little choice, the key participants felt at the time. "People were
saying, 'You have to save them, you're JPMorgan!"' Dimon remembered. "It was a wise
thing to do. ... JPMorgan should not stand in the way of doing something good because
we're being selfish or parochial." He later clarified his thinking. "My perspective, from the
start," Dimon explained, "was that we could not do anything that would jeopardize the health
of JPMorgan. That would not be good for our shareholders and it would not be good for the
financial system. But I also felt that, to the extent it was consistent with the best interests of
shareholders, we'd do everything we reasonably could to try to prevent the systematic dam-
age that the Bear Steams failure would cause. We and the whole board-we, the manage-
ment team, and the whole board of the company-viewed that as an obligation of JPMorgan
as a responsible corporate citizen.
'A 4
To be sure, this comment may be self-promoting, but it also illustrates can-
dor by a CEO who was in a position of awesome responsibility during a
national crisis. We see in this nuanced, perhaps conflicting, comment that
the consideration of a board and management during a financial crisis was
not a simplistic "What is good for shareholders?", but instead can be
broader to include the perceived responsibility of a corporate citizen in a
unique position to rescue a financial system. For a systemically-important
financial institution, its interest in profit and society's interest in a sound
market are intertwined; the board usually has the authority within the
sphere of business judgment to weigh such a matter and decide accordingly
without its decisions becoming subject to active judicial scrutiny. The
alignment of interests, however, is certainly not perfect. There undoubtedly
could be situations when shareholder pecuniary interest conflicts with
greater interest in social wealth and welfare. In these cases, the superior
principle is one of maximizing the social wealth.
While Delaware law cannot mandate the pursuit of the public welfare,
just as it cannot mandate shareholder profit maximization, without en-
croaching on the board's prerogative to manage the corporation, it leaves
the board with great leeway to do precisely that. The business judgment
rule protects board action within the bounds of rationality, and the board
can rely on such half-fictional, abstractized reasoning as pursuing the
"long-term" interest of the corporation and shareholders. Additionally,
Delaware law provides broad flexibility in terms of the provision of corpo-
rate assets in times of national crisis through sections 122(9) and 122(12) of
the DGCL. In crisis, fiduciary duty and board authority are elastic concepts
sufficient to encompass the promotion of the public welfare as the primary
objective of action. Accordingly, the liability scheme should reflect this.
414 COHAN, supra note 16, at 115-16.
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Despite the sometimes ideological nature of the defense of shareholder
primacy, we also see that corporate decision making is much more complex
than can be served by unconditional, bright-line rules or canons of eco-
nomic or political philosophy. The Bank-Merrill episode is instructive. The
Bank's board had many things to consider before determining whether to
complete the merger with Merrill, including the potential harm to the finan-
cial markets and the public welfare in time of great crisis. This is no small
consideration, and a systemically-important financial institution should
have important obligations toward the soundness of the financial system. In
this regard, the government acting through Paulson and Bernanke made
sure that the board fully considered all important factors in its decision.
Lastly, the financial sacrifice made by the Bank under the "taking a
bullet" scenario must be considered in the broader political and social con-
text in which even a corporation must navigate. Consider these indisputable
facts: financial institutions received unprecedented public aid during the
financial crisis;4"5 these firms bear a large responsibility for bringing about
the financial catastrophe; inside these firms, many managers and employees
are given large slices of the economic pie without any serious limitations
imposed by corporate law, and such disbursements are made even when this
class of professionals bears a large responsibility for the financial crisis. It
is said that "legitimate political questions about, for example, the social
distribution of wealth fall outside of the competence of corporate law." '416
Yet, it would be an odd result of corporate law and our economic organiza-
tion more broadly if corporate law is silent on whether these institutions can
take voluntary action to save a financial system that begets the opportunity
to create such vast wealth for their managers and employees as well as the
broader society.
Consider a counterfactual scenario in which the Bank terminated its
merger with Merrill, and thus exacerbated a financial market crash. In seek-
ing to defend their action, Lewis and board announce in a press release that
"the board acted consistent with its fiduciary duty to shareholders to protect
their economic interests," or this idea becomes the public perception. A
corporation's action to increase shareholder wealth irrespective of the cost
to society could have been the type of conscience-raising event that may
trigger consequential backlash, like the accounting scandals at Enron and
415 See generally ZANDI, supra note 29, at 228-29 tbl.12.3 (noting $12 trillion of public funds
committed as of March 2009).
416 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 2. See also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 249, at 38
("Society must choose whether to conscript the firm's strength (its tendency to maximize wealth) by
changing the prices it confronts or by changing its structure so that it is less apt to maximize wealth. The
latter choice will yield less of both good ends than the former."); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
220, at 442 ("[T]he most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests of nonshareholder
constituencies... lie outside of corporate law.").
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WorldCom that prompted the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
("SOX"I).
4 1 7
Shareholder primacy has little role in the government's policy decision
making. Even when the government is an investor in a bailout, it is myopic
to believe that such public funds are deployed for the primary benefit of the
shareholders in the firm. Any benefit to shareholders from government ac-
tion was incidental toward the larger goal of stabilizing a collapsing econ-
omy. In a crisis, larger issues can be at stake than the wealth of sharehold-
ers. As discussed above, the board of a financial institution could also le-
gitimately take a similar view. A board would have been well within its
authority to consider the public welfare as the primary, albeit temporary,
end of corporate action. Strong proponents of shareholder primacy would
have little moral ground to stake an opposition. During the financial crisis,
an unprecedented amount of public funds were deployed to support finan-
cial institutions. It is not so farfetched for a board to explicitly recognize a
quid pro quo. In a national crisis, the provision of public funds may be ad-
vanced to benefit corporations, and similarly corporate resources can be
deployed for the benefit of the public welfare, notwithstanding financial
harm to the corporation and shareholders.
IV. POLITICS OF CRISIS AND GOVERNANCE
During national crises and in a federalist system like ours, the federal
government has the primary obligation to address or coordinate the gov-
ernment's response. Such response may include using federal resources, as
well as coordinating the activities of others such as state and local govern-
ments, citizens, and perhaps even corporations. In this respect, the Bank-
Merrill episode teaches a historic lesson: that is, while acting through its
supervisory authority, the federal government can temporarily control the
board's function if it perceives that the board is potentially malfunctioning
during a national crisis. This fact has important implications on the future
design of substantive federal regulation of important industries, such as the
financial, energy, pharmaceutical, and technology sectors.
In recent years, the federal-state dichotomy in corporate law has gar-
nered much scholarly attention.418 For instances, Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf
Hamdani have argued that state competition for corporate law inadequately
417 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
418 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from His-
tory, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1794-95 (2006); Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note
281, at 1575; Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2494 (2005); Roe, supra note
289, at 591. See also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Govern-
ance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2003).
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protects investors and that a comprehensive, systematic review of federali-
zation is needed.4"9 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have argued that the
federal-state relationship is symbiotic, and that the federal government in-
tervenes in state law only in times of systemic change from significant
populist sentiments.4"' Mark Roe has argued that Delaware law is subordi-
nate to federal authority, so much so that it promotes federal policy, express




Corporate law is as much a product of political calculation as it is of
legal and economic deliberation.422 Despite the divergence of opinions on
the federal-state relationship and the federal preemption trigger, the ulti-
mate power resides with the federal government as the entire field can be
preempted.423 State corporate law is not constitutionally guaranteed. 424 If
state law undermines federal policy, state governments expose themselves
to federal preemption,425 something Delaware must consider.426
The failure of private corporate conduct to promote national policy
during crises could be considered a failure of corporate law if the law is
perceived to be a hindrance toward cooperation and assistance. For in-
stance, assume that the Bank held the stability of the global financial sys-
tem in its hands and it chose, per its legal right, to protect its parochial eco-
nomic interest at the cost of triggering a collapse of the financial system
and great harm to the national economy. Subsequently, documents are pro-
duced that the Bank engaged in a "Ford Pinto"-type cost-benefit analysis427
in justifying the board's decision. What would be the consequences on the
company, its board and management, and the financial industry sector? An
appropriately outraged public and government may result in corrective leg-
islation as was the case with the SOX, which was enacted in response to the
419 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 418, at 1794,1798.
420 Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 281, at 1576.
421 Roe, supra note 289, at 591-93.
422 See generally id.
423 See id. at 633-34. See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
424 See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doc-
trine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 34-36, 46-47 (1987) (criticizing the theory that the
internal affairs doctrine has constitutional basis); Jed Rubenfeld, State Takeover Legislation and the
Commerce Clause: The "Foreign" Corporations Problem, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 380-82 (1988)
(same).
425 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 418, at 1829 ("To be sure, some of the most extensive
federal incursions were sparked by the collapse of the stock market or some other national crisis.");
Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 281, at 1576 ("[T]he possibility of federal preemption
constitutes a threat to Delaware, but this threat is significant only in times ... when systemic change is
seen as generating a significant populist payoff."); Roe, supra note 418, at 2528 ("National political
forces, if powerful enough to temporarily overcome Delaware's agenda-setting power, could also move
the game to Washington.").
426 See generally Roe, supra note 289.
427 See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
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accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and other corporations. Private
corporate governance cannot be insulated from public crisis management.
In the Bank-Merrill episode, the government executed a temporary,
indirect public takeover of corporate governance function when it appeared
that the board would undermine federal policy.428 The legal mess and in-
creased systemic risk arising from an attempt to terminate the merger would
have, in the words of Paulson, exhibited "a colossal lack of judgment." '4 29 It
was fortunate that this temporary, indirect takeover of board governance
was possible because the federal government had the tool of bank supervi-
sory authority. If the supervisory authority did not extend to a credible
threat to fire the board and the management, the situation could have de-
volved to a board malfunction, and worse, the injection of more systemic
risk into a badly damaged financial market.
Since the Merrill acquisition successfully closed, we are left with the
question of whether a means of direct federal intervention in corporate gov-
ernance is needed. The answer depends in part on whether the board would
be found liable for its action. If liability arises from the board's decision not
to exercise the MAC, whether the option was viable or not, such liability
would introduce uncertainty in future crises. The decision under state law
would in effect undermine the authority of federal regulators and the le-
gitimacy of their actions. In the next national crisis, rather than engaging in
a cooperative relationship with the government, the board may exploit the
crisis to pursue a narrow financial interest irrespective of any consequences
to the public welfare, or at least it may be reluctant to make a sacrifice on
behalf of the public welfare.
This possibility was openly discussed during congressional testimonies
of Bernanke and Paulson. The potential for federal intervention in corporate
law has already been recognized in congressional hearings. The following
exchange between Bernanke and Representative Bill Foster43 ° is illustrative.
Q. [D]o you believe that there are circumstances in which the CEO of a systemically impor-
tant firm might be expected to have his shareholders take a bullet, to protect the overall
health of the economy, in a crisis situation?
428 Clearly, the bailouts associated with the financial crisis resulted in direct government involve-
ment in managerial decisions, such as the termination of executives and determination of appropriate
compensation. See, e.g., David Cho & Tomoch Murakami Lee, U.S. Forced Bank Board to Carry Out
Merrill Deal, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2009, at A 16 (noting banks' hesitancy to accept government bail-
out money because banks are wary of the government's ability to restrict executive pay and make other
managerial decisions).
429 Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 88, at 4. As discussed, there is the possibility that
Lewis never intended to invoke the MAC and that he used the threat to cover up a poorly executed
merger and secure federal financial aid for the Bank. See supra Part I.D.
430 Democrat, 14th District of Illinois; Member of House Committee on Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform, and Subcommittee on Domestic Policy.
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A. No, that's not-that's not appropriate under supervisory practice. And we have not done
that.
Q. Okay. And so do you believe that there is any need for any additional legal clarity about
the duties, of a CEO, to the shareholders, to the regulators and to the overall economy, in
times of systemic crisis?
A. Well, that might be something for Congress to consider. But I think the rules as they cur-
rently stand are quite clear, that you can't force somebody to take actions, against the interest
of their own company, for systemic reasons alone.
4 31
Bernanke and Foster acknowledged that state corporate law may be am-
biguous as to the fiduciary duty of the board and officers during a public
crisis. Also, Bernanke's testimony must be parsed. The government's su-
pervisory authority over financial institutions under federal banking law did
not encompass forcing a company to make a financial sacrifice. This must
be distinguished from the board's authority under state corporate law to
take such action, and he left open the possibility of a federal safe harbor if
the legal point is not already clear in state corporate law.
During Paulson's testimony, Representative Foster again inquired into
the possibility of a federal safe harbor, and Paulson answered that "the
more legal clarity we have the better" and that the issue, while "very com-
plicated[,] . . . is certainly one I think that bears consideration."432 Later in
his testimony, in response to the question of whether the government can
fire the management and board of a bank, Paulson commented further:
I have an understanding that under unusual circumstances, if the Federal Reserve is dealing
with a regulated entity and that there are decisions made at that regulated entity that endan-
gers the safety and soundness of that institution, then the Fed has the authority to hold them
accountable. Now, clearly in terms of corporate governance 101, we have-you know, we
know how boards are selected and we know that boards select management But there needs




Here, again, another federal regulator who was at the front line of the finan-
cial crisis expressed his view that greater clarity of board obligation and
perhaps greater regulatory authority to elicit corporate cooperation may be
needed through federal legislation.
The testimonies of Bernanke and Paulson suggest that there may be
potentially counterproductive ambiguities in the understanding of a board's
duty in times of crisis, and potential conflicts between the government's
obligation to protect the public welfare and the board's duty under state
corporate law. The Bank-Merrill episode bears this out. Only a legally un-
431 Bemanke Congressional Testimony, supra note 45.
432 Paulson Congressional Testimony, supra note 88.
433 Id. at 40.
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viable option to terminate the merger averted a true Hobson's choice be-
tween shareholder profit and public wealth and welfare. Banking supervi-
sory authority was sufficiently broad to ensure that the board did not mal-
function by selecting a legally reckless stratagem. In the future, the happen-
stance of the existence of regulatory power may be absent.
This leaves Delaware with an essential political calculation. If state
corporate law is perceived to be inadequate, Congress may need to enact a
federal safe harbor because private industry cooperation may be essential to
advance important government and public welfare objectives in time of
crisis. As discussed in Part II.B, a theory of fiduciary exemption can be
justified by public necessity. Public necessity is a defense to a voluntary act
of destruction or injury to property in response to a public crisis. It does not
obligate the rescue of a person or situation.
Legislation can be more aggressive and may require a duty to rescue,
at least among certain key industry sectors such as the financial, energy,
technology, and pharmaceutical sectors. Here, there is another useful tort
analogy. The general rule in tort law is that there is no duty to rescue.434
Only when there is a special relationship will courts sometimes impose an
affirmative duty to rescue.435 The implication of these rules on corporate
law is clear. It is inconceivable that state corporate law, either through stat-
ute or judicial ruling, would impose a duty to rescue the government or the
public in a crisis. The duty to rescue is inconsistent with the philosophy of
personal autonomy and liberty,436 and it would be inconsistent with the view
of the corporation as primarily an aggregation of property rights.
To be clear, I do not advocate an affirmative duty to rescue. A shift
from an informed, voluntary action of a board to a legal mandate for a res-
cue would swing the pendulum too far in favor of sacrificing private prop-
erty for the public welfare. This is philosophically unpalatable. My theory
of fiduciary exemption is based on the premise that a corporate board
should and does have great authority to make informed decisions with the
interest of all constituents in mind, including the greater public wealth and
welfare, and this authority should be unchecked by legal constraints during
the limited circumstance of a public crisis in which the firm is uniquely
situated to avert a far greater harm at the cost of a private sacrifice. I simply
raise the issue of a duty to rescue because it is not inconceivable that federal
legislation could mandate a duty to rescue. The conditions necessary to
enact the legislation would be a conscience-raising event during a public
crisis, such as a "Ford Pinto"-type cost-benefit analysis or the mass percep-
434 See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that there is no duty to rescue
a drowning man).
435 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 351 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a
psychiatrist has a duty to warn the intended victim of a violent crime potentially perpetrated by his
patient).
436 Epstein, supra note 313, at 198-203.
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tion of it. Additionally, certain companies or industries must be perceived
to have a special relationship to the public welfare, and some obvious can-
didates are the financial, energy, technology, and pharmaceutical sectors.
CONCLUSION
The affairs of the corporation are considered private activity. The pre-
vailing concept of the firm is a nexus of private contract rights among par-
ticipants in an economic enterprise. These assertions undoubtedly have a
certain descriptive power about them, but very little in law is categorical or
axiomatic. In time of crisis, corporate activity can take the form of public-
private activity, or at least it can impart significantly greater effects on so-
cial wealth and public welfare. In these situations, the normal rules do not
apply. Just to be clear, this Article does not advocate corporate suicide or
self-mutilation even as an aspirational matter. Crisis or not, there should be
no such principle in corporate law requiring the impairment of a going con-
cern. The thesis here is that there should be an exemption from the fiduciary
principle when a board pursues the public good over the private gain on a
temporary basis when the firm is uniquely situated to avert or mitigate a
public crisis. If the cost-benefit analysis on a broader level is obvious, a
board should be allowed to provide aid to the public without legal risk
overhanging its decision.
The theory of fiduciary exemption may be controversial to strong pro-
ponents of shareholder primacy, but more radical, in my view, is a legal
rule requiring a board to pursue private economic gain at a tremendous di-
rect cost to society given the Hobson's choice when a board can avoid such
cost through the provision of aid. In light of the unprecedented rescue of the
private sector with public funds during the financial crisis, as may be ex-
pected when markets fail or a public crisis ensues, a legal rule that jeopard-
izes or deters a voluntary rescue would be morally suspect given the nexus
of social relationships and the expectation of reciprocity of aid, which were
evident in the financial crisis.
I am also comforted by two thoughts. First, the animating principle of
corporate law is the maximization of social wealth and welfare, and not the
more narrow interest of shareholder profit, which is essentially a distribu-
tive principle. In time of crisis, the benefit to the public may be so large and
obvious that the presumption of shareholder primacy is clearly rebutted by
the potential harm. The cost-benefit analysis may permit a primary obliga-
tion to consider the public good. Second, we are left with the plain fact that
amidst a real, immediate, truly national economic crisis, shareholder pecu-
niary interest did in fact become rather incidental. It was clear at the time
that the board of the Bank had many other considerations in its deliberation
than shareholder profit maximization. In this episode, the legal relevance of
the board's motivation may be moot because the company may not have
had a contractual option to avoid financial loss, but it shows how corporate
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decision making cannot be reduced to the mandate of enhancing firm value
during a public crisis.
The real world can be more complex than the abstractions of principles
or dogma devoid of context. Even if it could be shown that the Bank's
shareholders would have financially gained from terminating the Merrill
acquisition, the board would have been well within its authority to close the
deal when the harm to the public's interest would have been great, and it
should be allowed to do so publicly and without resort to such disingenuous
illusion as the "long-term interest of the corporation and shareholders."
Such honesty may have the positive effect of recognizing that the corporate
enterprise is integrated into the fabric of society rather than a separate, dis-
crete nexus of contracts removed from the surrounding context and de-
signed solely to maximize value for the residual claimant. Under the cir-
cumstance of a national crisis, courts should not penalize a board for acting
in the interest of the public welfare as a matter of the practical politics be-
tween state and the federal governments, lest there be a potential federal
response in the form of greater federal control of corporate governance ei-
ther directly through a federal safe harbor or indirectly through the grant of
more power to regulators.
The financial crisis of 2008 will not be the only national crisis. We can
expect large crises in the future, though how they manifest is unpredictable.
Perhaps the next crisis will be a large scale war, another economic collapse,
a pandemic, or a large natural catastrophe. In these situations, the social
wealth and public welfare should not be sacrificed upon the altar of share-
holder primacy. Faith therein has its limits. Stated more bluntly, let us iso-
late the problem to its pure essence. Recall the hypothetical of the pharma-
ceutical company that sacrifices billions of dollars of profit in the face of a
global flu pandemic and the resources of government is limited. The deci-
sion whether to sacrifice profit or take a financial loss is premised on three
questions. First, can the board do this within current construct of corporate
law? Yes, such authority is a part of the corporate contract. Second, should
the board have the power to do this? Absolutely; along with the govern-
ment, the corporation is the only entity that can muster the enormous re-
sources of society to aid in time of great crisis. Third, should the board do
this? There is no easy answer. This is a business judgment of the board,
absent some federal mandate through substantive regulation. In making this
judgment, the board may take into account moral considerations, the exi-
gencies of the human condition, and the common obligation of all members
of society to care for each other on some essential level, in addition to the
consideration of profit. In this difficult circumstance, such decisions based
on public necessity are so great that the calculus should be free of legal risk.
Thus, in a time of national crisis, the shareholder primacy norm can and
sometimes does fail the stress test.
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